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**Educational  Testing  Service In  May  1997,  the  official  unemployment  rate  reported  by the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  (BLS)  was  4.5  percent,  the  lowest  rate  in twenty-four  years.  Not  since  the  era  of 
President  Richard  Nixon  had  the jobless  rate been  this  low.  The  BLS  also  reported  that 
unemployment  had  now  remained  below  6 percent  for thirty-three  months  in a row.,  Not  long  ago 
most  economists  would  have  considered  such  an unemployment  record  impossible  to achieve,  or 
at least  impossible  without  igniting  an explosive  cycle  of  wage-led  inflation.  Yet  prices  have 
remained  under  control.  During  the  past  two  and  half  years,  the  consumer  price  index  has  risen 
only  2.8  percent  a year  -- well  less  tharl  half  the  average  annual  inflation  rate  of  the  1980’s. 
Moreover,  instead  of  accelerating  as the jobless  rate  dropped,  monthly  price  increases  in early 
1997 were  smaller  than  in the  preceding  year.  In the  first  quarter  of  1997,  when  the  economy 
was  growing  at a red-hot  5.9  percent  annual  rate,  inflation  was  trending  downward  toward  1.8 
percent. 
Such  a sanguine  employment/inflation  environment  has  forced  economists  back  to  the 
drawing  boards  to  try to  figure  out  why  reality  has  seemingly  so conspicuously  trumped -2- 
economic  theory.  As  Steven  Pearlstein  (1997)  of  the  Washington  Post  reports,  “A decade  ago,  if 
you’d  predicted  (this)  kind  of economic  development,  many  economists  and  business  leaders 
would  have  laughed.”  Federal  Reserve  Board  chairman  Alan  Greenspan,  in his  biennial  report  to 
Congress  in July  1997,  proclaimed  that  the current  state  of  the  economy  was  superb.  Further, 
despite  the  official  low  unemployment  rate,  he conceded  that  there  were  no  immediate,  signs  of 
inflation  on  the  horizon. 
Many  business  writers  have  been  forced  to abandon  the  old  orthodoxy  and  talk  of a new 
“paradigm”  in which  rising  inflation  is no longer  set off  by unemployment  rates  as low  as five 
percent.  Since  this  is uncharted  territory,  no one  know  how  low  the  unemployment  rate  can  be 
and  still  not  cause  prices  to rise.  Is it 5 percent?  Or 4.5 percent?  Or perhaps  even  4 percent? 
Some  analysts  have  noted  that  some  states  and  regional  labor  markets  have  maintained  local 
unemployment  rates  of  four  percent  without  any signs  of upward  wage  pressures.  This  situation 
can  be  viewed  as evidence  that  we  are not  even  close  to excessively  tight  labor  markets. 
There  is no  end  to speculation  about  the causes  of this  new  benign  economic  climate. 
Improved  productivity,  particularly  in manufacturing,  is given  credit  for helping  to keep  a lid on 
prices.  Output  per  hour  in the  goods-producing  sector  has  been  growing  at nearly  3 percent  a 
year  since  1989 -- a level  nearly  half  again  as large  as during  the  1970’s and  equal  to the  rate 
during  the  “golden  years”  of the  1960’s.  This  has  helped  contain  costs  in many  industries.  In 
some  prices  are even  falling.’  Declining  transportation  costs  are  another  factor.  While  freight 
’  For  example,  in the  year  ending  in May  1997, producer  prices  for  heavy  trucks  were 
down  4.5  percent,  glass  container  prices  were  off  2.9 percent,  photographic  equipment  was  down 
2.3  percent,  and  major  consumer  goods  from  household  appliances  to toys  and  cosmetics  saw 
consumer  price  declines  ranging  from  I  to 2.2 percent  (Mandel,  1997a). -3- 
volume  continues  to grow,  its cost  as a percentage  of GDP  has  fallen  from  about  7 percent  in 
1990 to under  6 percent  today.  This  is due  in part  to the  rapid  diffusion  of  high-tech  equipment 
throughout  these  industries  including  electronic  scanners  for  tracking  shipment:  and  more  fuel 
efficient  trucks,  locomotives,  and  aircraft  (Matthews,  1997). 
Most  surprisingly,  the  service  sector  (over  and  above  transportation)  is c oing  its part  too. 
Until  recently,  economists  believed  that  service  sector  price  increases  were  ine.  itable  because  of 
“Baumol’s  disease,”  a reference  to the  theoretical  work  of New  York  University  economist 
William  Baumol.  In the  1960’s, Baumol  (1967)  postulated  that  the  rate  of  infl,ition  would  tend  to 
increase  over  time  as the  economy  moved  into  the  post-industrial  age  and  serl  ices  became  a 
larger  part  of  national  output.  This  would  occur  because  services  are essenti;  Ily labor-intensive, 
unlike  manufacturing,  and  presumably  cannot  count  on  automation  to boost  productivity.  After 
all,  how  can  anyone  boost  the  efficiency  with  which  the  New  York  Philharr  ronic  plays 
Beethoven’s  Ninth? 
Now  the  “cost  disease”  in such  sectors  as health  care,  education,  an 1 even  legal  services 
is proving  susceptible  to treatment,  if not  cure,  by new  medical  and  educafional  technologies  and 
by  information  technologies  more  generally.  The  inflation  rate  for housillg,  medical  care, 
college  tuition,  and  auto  insurance  are all on  a downward  path.  Prices  in the  non-energy  services 
sector  as a whole  rose  by only  2.3 percent  in  1996.  By comparison,  the  lowest  rate  at any  time 
during  the  1980’s was  4.7%.  Michael  Mandel  of BusinessWeek reports  that  nearly  70 percent  of 
the  entire  drop  in inflation  since  1986 has come  from  services,  a rather  startling  finding  given 
that  manufacturing  is normally  credited  with  keeping  inflation  at bay  (Mandel,  1997b). 
The  recent  decline  in service  sector  inflation,  particularly  in health  care,  has  had  an -4- 
ancillary  beneficial  impact  on  the  cost  of employee  benefits  throughout  the  economy.  After 
rising  by better  than  2 percent  per  year  earlier  in the  decade,  benefit  costs  actually  declined  in 
1995 and  again  in  1996, reigning  in overall  employment  cost  increases  despite  tighter  labor 
markets  (Bernstein.  1996). 
All  of these  factors  play  a role  in creating  the  present  low-unemployment/low-inflation 
environment.  But  we  believe  there  is something  much  deeper  at work.  This  has  to do  with  how 
the  expansion  of global  markets,  the  deregulation  of key  industries,  the  weakening  of  labor 
unions,  and  corporate  downsizing  have  fundamentally  changed  the  structure  of  labor  supply.  All 
of  these  factors  have  generated  a greater  sense  of  job  insecurity  (and  we  might  add  stagnating  or, 
in many  cases,  declining  family  income.)  Beginning  in  1996, Alan  Greenspan  began  to suggest 
that  prices  have  been  held  in check  because  workers  have  foregone  wage  hikes  for job  security 
(Greenspan.  1996).  He  noted  that  the  past  few  years  have  been  a period  of extraordinary  labor 
peace,  with  strike  activity  at its lowest  point  in the  last half  century  and  unions  often  pledging 
themselves  to five  and  six  year  contracts  in an attempt  to lock  in job  security  at the  expense  of 
higher  wages.  As  such,  despite  low  unemployment  and  a strong  economy,  there  is little  wage 
pressure  and  no  tendency  toward  a wage-price  spiral. 
We  think  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  is largely  correct.  Job  insecurity  is a critical 
factor.  but  we  believe  the  mechanism  that  links job  insecurity  (and  stagnating  incomes)  to price 
stability  has  less  to do  with  union  contracts  and  more  to do  with  a fundamental  shift  in what  we 
term  the  “labor  supply  regime.”  In brief,  this  policy  paper  will  present  evidence  that  both 
increased  job  insecurity  and  stagnating  incomes  have  kept  inflation  in check  by encouraging 
increased  labor  supplyfronz  incLlrnbent workers  to meet  increased  labor  demand  as the  economy -5- 
expands.  The  key  point  is that  in this  new  regime,  the  venerable  Say’s  Law  has  been  turned  on  its 
head:  increased  demand  creates  its own  supply.  In the  face  of heightened  job  insecurity  and 
declining  wage  rates,  workers  now  toil  as many  hours  as possible  when  jobs  are plentiful  in 
anticipation  of  future  downsizing  and job  loss  -- and  they  do  this  at existing  wage  rates. 
Moreover,  declining  hourly  wage  rates  even  in the  absence  of job  insecurity  have  forced 
individuals  and  families  to  increase  their  hours  of work  simply  to maintain  their  annual  incomes. 
This  relieves  what  otherwise  would  be a significant  labor  supply  constraint  that  normally 
accompanies  low  official  unemployment  rates.  Instead  of having  to raise  wages  to attract  more 
workers,  firms  have  increasingly  been  able  to fill  their  additional  need  for  labor  by employing 
their  own  workers  longer  or by offering  second  jobs  to workers  who  are employed  elsewhere. 
This  is far different  from  the  labor  supply  “regime”  of the  1970’s when  economic  growth 
depended  much  more  on  coaxing  additional  workers  into  the  labor  force  -  a practice  which 
history  suggests  required  offering  higher  wages. 
This  new  source  of  labor  supply  has essentially  eliminated  inflationary  pressure  in the 
overall  economy  despite  low  official  jobless  rates.  Until  workers  realize  significantly  higher 
hourly  pay  rates  and  experience  greater  employment  security,  it is likely  that  the  upward  trend  in 
weekly  and  annual  work  hours  will  continue.  Unemployment  rates  below  5 percent  -- perhaps 
even  in the  4 percent  range  -- can  thus  be maintained  without  serious  inflation.  This  shift  toward 
a “high  work  time”  regime  suggests  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  should  shy  away  from 
according  much  weight  to the  official  unemployment  statistics  which  by construction  fail  to 
detect  such  a shift  in labor  supply. 
This  paper  will  be organized  in three  parts.  First,  we  will  present  the  logic  and  original -6- 
evidence  for  Phillip’s  Curve  and  NAIRU.  We  will  show  that  the  sources  of  increased  labor 
supply  during  the  past  two  expansions  have  shifted  significantly  compared  with  the  experience  of 
the  1970’s business  cycle.  The  second  part  will  review  the  debate  over  whether  American 
workers  are putting  in  more  hours  at work.  We  will  develop  our  own  measure  of  working  time 
to  look  at male,  female,  and  family  working  time  since  the  late  1960’s.  In the  third  section,  we 
rely  on  longitudinal  data  to show  that  individual  workers  are increasingly  having  more  ups  and 
downs  in their  employment  histories  over  subsequent  ten-year  periods. 
The  Unemplovment  Rate,  NAIRU,  and  Economic  Policy 
The  importance  of  this  new  labor  supply  regime  can  best  be understood  in historical 
context.  Until  quite  recently,  economists’  pessimism  about  the  potential  for  simultaneous  low 
unentployment  and  low  inflation  was  based  on a particular  model  of  labor  market  behavior.  At 
“low”  official  unemployment  rates,  unused  capacity  in the  workforce  was  thought  to be  virtually 
exhausted.  With  fewer  workers  seeking  jobs,  employers  in the  market  for  additional  staff  would 
have  to raise  wages  in order  to coax  workers  to leave  other  firms  to join  theirs.  With  greater 
confidence  in their  ability  to find  more  remunerative  work,  workers  would  pressure  their  own 
employers  for  higher  pay.  When  sufficient  workers  do  this  and  companies  capitulate  to their 
demands,  firms  are  forced  to raise  their  prices  to cover  their  added  costs  -- or see  their  profits 
erode.  With  prices  rising,  workers  are motivated  to ask for  additional  wages  to maintain  their 
purchasing  power.  In many  union  contracts,  “cost  of  living  adjustments”  (COLA’s) 
automatically  do  this.  Left  unchecked,  an overheated  economy  will  generate  sufficient  upward 
price  pressure  to undermine  profit  rates  and  stock  market  prices.  In turn,  investment  will  begin -7- 
to  shrink  and  the  economy  will  head  into  a tailspin. 
In this  way,  inflation  leads  ineluctably  to  its opposite  -  recession.  The  wage-price  spiral 
begins  with  unemployment  below  its “natural  rate.”  Prices  then  rise  at ever  faster  rates  until 
stable  corporate  planning  can  no  longer  be maintained.  As  firms  cut  back  and  lay off  personnel, 
unemployment  grows  and  workers  begin  to experience  job  insecurity.  Lower  production  and  the 
growing  inability  of  workers  to win  wage  increases  finally  undermine  inflationary  pressures.  The 
slowdown  ultimately  lays  the  seeds  for  a recovery,  but  not  without  large  losses  in output  and 
income. 
To  forestall  such  an outcome,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  is supposed  to resort  to 
preemptive  action,  raising  short  term  interest  rates  to slow  the  economy  and  nudge 
unemployment  rates  back  up  into  a “safe”  zone.  Iflow  unemployment  rates  are a good  indicator 
of  tight  labor  markets,  then  such  Fed  action  can  be justified  as a deliberate  deterrent  to  a roller- 
coaster  cycle  of  inflation  and  recession.  We  may  not  relish  the  idea  that  a reserve  army  of  7 to  8 
million  unemployed  workers  is needed  to tame  the  business  cycle,  but  the  presumed  alternative 
of  recurrent  bouts  of  hyper-inflation  and  double-digit  unemployment  is viewed  as even  less 
palatable. 
This  concept  of  a “natural  rate”  of unemployment  was  first  introduced  by Milton 
Friedman  ( 1968) and  almost  simultaneously  by Edmund  Phelps  (1968).  Its more  formal  name, 
the  “non-accelerating-inflation  rate  of unemployment”  or NAIRU,  suggests  that  below  some 
“natural  unemployment  rate”  increases  in aggregate  demand  will  result  not  simply  in price 
increases,  but  accelerating  rates  of  inflation.  Early  estimates  of  the  NAIRU,  based  on 
experience  in the  U.S.  from  1960- 1990 placed  the  natural  rate  in the  neighborhood  of  6 percent. -8- 
Ever  since  the  concept  of NAIRU  was  first  propounded,  there  have  been  theoretical  and 
statistical  criticisms  of  the concept.  In recent  work,  Robert  Eisner  (I 996)  has  demonstrated  a 
significant  asymmetry  in the  NAIRU.  He finds  that  while  unemployment  above  the  NAIRU  may 
have  historically  lowered  inflation  in the  U.S.  as the  theory  suggests,  rates  below  the  NAIRU 
have  had  little  or no  lasting  effect  in increasing  inflation.  Hence,  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  itself 
is open  to dispute.  Others.  including  Robert  J. Gordon  (1997)  and  Douglas  Staiger.  James  Stock, 
and  Mark  Watson  (1997)  conclude  that  NAIRU  exists,  but  it varies  over  time.  In analyzing  the 
period  1955  1996, Gordon  concludes  that  the  time-varying  (TV)  NAIRU  has  drifted  downward 
from  6.2  percent  in the  late  1980’s to 5.7 percent  in the  mid-1990’s  (measured  on  the  GDP 
deflator).  Staiger,  Stock,  and  Watson  also  find  a decline  in the point estimates  of NAIRU  from 
6.8  percent  in  1984 to  5.9 percent  in  1994 (measured  on  the  CPI)  as well  as a large  standard  error 
around  the  estimated  point  estimates. 
The  key  point,  however,  is that  in all of these  cases,  the  variable  of  note  is the  official 
unemployment  rate  and  inflationary  pressures  are still  thought  to be forthcoming  at 
unemployment  rates  well  in excess  of 5.0 percent.  For  its part,  members  of the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  have  indicated  that  they  consider  many  factors  in gauging  potential  inflationary  pressure  in 
the  economy  including  the extent  to which  physical  capital  is being  utilized  and  the  degree  to 
which  the  stock  market  may  be overvalued.  But  for the  Fed  as well,  the  official  unemployment 
rate  is clearly  the  single  indicator  of  unused  capacity  that  receives  the  most  attention.2 
’  Soon  after  the jobless  rate  first  slipped  below  6 percent  in  1994, the  Fed  raised  short- 
term  interest  rates  a quarter  point  and  followed  this  up  with  five  more  rate  hikes  in quick 
succession,  deliberately  trying  to slow  the  economy.  The  Fed  action  “worked.”  Although 
inflation  never  did  appear  as a problem,  the  higher  interest  rates  slowed  the  GDP  growth  rate 
(continued...) Fighting  the  Last  War 
-9- 
What  has  motivated  Fed  policy  during  the  past  two  decades  is a steac fast  vigilance 
against  any  possible  recurrence  of the  violent  business  cycle  that  pummeled  American  families 
and  businesses  during  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.  The  annual  rate of  ir crease  in the 
consumer  price  index  rose  from  5.8  percent  in  1976 to an unprecedented  1’1.5  percent  in  1980 as 
unemployment  fell  from  8.5  percent  in  1975 to 5.8 percent  in  1979.  Back  then,  the  Fed  under 
newly-appointed  chairman  Paul  Volcker  raised  interest  rates  deliberately  o crush  inflation, 
slowing  the  economy  to the  point  where  the  national  unemployment  rate  -eached  nearly  I I 
percent  in December  1982.  Since no one wants to live through those tim :s again,  the  low 
unemployment  rates  we  have  experienced  over  the  past  two  and  half  yea’s  are  viewed  with  some 
concern.  If the  historical  record  is considered,  it seems  to provide  a cle.ir  signal  that  we  have 
crossed  over  into  the  danger  zone  where  a tight  labor  market  will  lead  to an explosive  wage-price 
inflationary  cycle. 
But  will  it?  If a 
tightness  as it did  in the 
4.8 percent  jobless  rate  connotes  the  same  degree  of  labor  market 
1970’s, then  we are almost  surely  in for  another  bout  of  serious  inflation 
*(...continued) 
from  3.5 percent  in  1994 to just  2.0 percent  in  1995.  More  recently,  in March  of  1997,  the  Board 
raised  the  federal  funds  rate  -- the  interest  rate  member  banks  charge  for overnight  loans  -- soon 
after  the  BLS  announced  that  the  unemployment  rate  had  fallen  to 5.2 percent.  And,  again,  only 
days  after  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  announced  that  the  unemployment  rate  had  fallen  under 
5 percent  in April  1997,  Alan  Greenspan  was publicly  warning  of  labor  markets  that  seemed  to 
have  become  too  tight  for  the  good  of  the  economy.  Speaking  at New  York  University,  he  noted 
that  “While  there  is scant  evidence  of  any  imminent  resurgence  of  inflation  at the  moment,  there 
also  appears  to be  little  slack  in our  capacity  to produce.”  (Quoted  in Schlesinger,  1997) That  the 
Fed  was  considering  raising  interest  rates  again  to purposefully  slow  the  economy  was  clear  from 
his  remarks.  Presumably,  Greenspan  was judging  that  at such  low  unemployment  rates,  feelings 
of job  insecurity  surely  had  to be evaporating. -lO- 
unless  the  Fed  acts  immediately  by strongly  applying  the  monetary  brakes.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  unemployment  rate  is no  longer  a reliable  measure  of  the  remaining  store  of  unutilized  labor 
supply.  then  we  may  be  able  to  safely  ignore  the unemployment  rate  and  allow  the  economy  to 
grow  without  attempting  to moderate  it.  Military  historians  refer  to “fighting  the  last  war,”  a 
reference  to how  veteran  generals  have  pursued  new  wars  using  the  outdated  lessons  from  what 
went  wrong  in the  last. 
Data  on  the  past  three  business  cycle  expansions  suggest  that  such  a regime  shift  has 
occurred.  IJI  Chart  I, we  have  plotted  the  inflation  rate against  the  unemployment  rate  lagged 
one  period.  In each  case,  the  data  series  begins  in the  year  in which  the  unemployment  rate 
reached  a cyclical  peak  and  is followed  until  the jobless  rate bottoms  out. 
As  the  chart  demonstrates,  the  trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment  has 
improved  markedly  since  the  1970’s.  Back  then,  inflation  was  running  in excess  of six  percent  a 
year  even  with  7.5  percent  of  the  labor  force  unemployed.  As  the  unemployment  rate came 
down,  the  inflation  rate  rose  sharply  in a clear  “Phillip’s  Curve”  pattern.  Tightening  labor 
markets  on  top  of pent-up  price  pressures  from  the  abolition  of Nixon  era wage  and  price 
controls  plus  the  second  oil  shock  of the  decade  drove  inflation  to record  levels  as the 
unemployment  rate  fell  below  6.5  percent. -1 l- 
Chart  1 
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The  trade-off  during  the  1980’s recovery  was  much  more  benign.  During  the  entire 
expansionary  portion  of  the  cycle,  inflation  remained  below  the  1970 rates  and  the  entire 
inflation-unemployment  pattern  was  generally  flat until  unemployment  fell  below  6.5  percent.  In 
the  current  recovery,  there  is hardly  any  hint  of any  trade-off.  Even  ur  jobless  rates  below  6 
percent,  there  does  not  crppenr to be n Phillip’s  Curve  nt all.  This  is what  has  economists 
stumped.  History  does  not  appear  to be repeating  itself  as the  inflation-unemployment 
a  relationship  seems  to be fundamentally  shifting.  It is time-varying  as Gordon  suggests,  but  we 
are not  finding  much  price  pressure  even  at unemployment  rates  well  below  his  estimated 
NAIRU  of  5.7  percent. -IL- 
Measuring  Labor  Market  Supply 
The  problem,  we  believe,  lies  less  in the  theory  underlying  NAIRU  and  more  in the  data 
used  to estimate  it.  Essentially,  the  Phillip’s  Curve  -- the  tradeoff  between  inflation  and 
unemployment  -- has  been  shifting  downward  and  flattening  out  not  because  the  Phillip’s  Curve 
has ceased  to exist,  but  because  the  official  unemployment  rate  is at best  a proxy  for  labor  supply 
conditions  and  increasingly  a poor  one.  The  same  (low)  unemployment  rate  in the  1990’s does 
not  signal  the  same  degree  of “tightness”  in labor  supply  as it did  in the  1970’s.  As  such,  the 
relationship  between  unused  labor  supply  and  inflation  may  still  hold,  but  one  can  no  longer  rely 
on  the  official  unemployment  rate  as a reliable  measure  of unused  workforce  capacity.  Very  tight 
labor  markets  may  still  lead  to wage-price  pressures,  but even  a 4.8  percent  unemployment  rate 
may  no  longer  be an indication  of such  labor  market  conditions. 
In its more  technical  work,  hardly  ever  reported  by the  media,  the  BLS  admits  the  official 
unemployment  rate  is only  one  of  many  measures  of labor  utilization.  Indeed,  each  month  the 
agency  calculates  a range  of unemployment  rates,  each  including  one  or more  groups  of 
individuals  potentially  available  for  work  but  who  are not  officially  unemployed.  These 
additional  underutilized  workers  include  those  who  are involuntarily  part-time,  those  who  are 
“discouraged”and  therefore  have  given  up  looking  for a job,  and  workers  who  were  previously 
looking  but  gave  up  because  of the  press  of family  responsibilities  or other  reasons.  Presumably 
many  of  these  workers  would  be ready  to go back  to work  if an appropriate  job  suddenly  became 
available.  Labor  force  participation  is thus  a function  of job  availability.  In this  case,  the 
standard  unemployment  rate  is an inaccurate  measure  of unused  labor  supply. 
But  there  is an even  more  fundamental  reason  why  relying  on  the  standard  jobless  rate -13- 
can  be  misleading.  Measuring  the  true  su ~ply of labor  involves  more  than  co’mting  the  number 
of people  working  or prepared  to work  as  he official  measure  does.  Change:  in the number  of 
hours  incumbent  workers  put  in on  the job  can  be just  as important  as changr:s  in the  number  of 
unemployed  workers  themselves.  This  is completely  overlooked  in the  offic ial statistics  for  the 
BLS  counts  anyone  working  one  hour  or more  for pay  as in the  labor  force  2 nd employed.  If 
incumbent  workers  increase  their  hours  of work,  this  is irrelevant  to the  unemployment  rate  -- but 
hardly  irrelevant  to the  level  of  labor  supply.  A one  percent  increase  in the  qumber  of  hours 
worked  per  worker  for  a fixed  supply  of  labor  is mathematically  equivalen!  in terms  of  labor 
supply  to  a one  percent  increase  in the  number  of workers.  Hence,  from  the  perspective  of 
“workforce  capacity”  the  two  are equivalent.  Moreover,  if incumbent  wo’kers  have  higher 
productivity  than  new  workers  who  are brought  in from  the end  of the  hirng  queue,  then 
increased  labor  supply  from  existing  employees  raises  potential  economic  growth  more  than  the 
labor  supplied  by new  labor  force  entrants. 
If average  work  hours  remained  reasonably  fixed  over  time,  the  unemployment  rate 
would  be a good  proxy  for  overall  labor  supply.  But  this  has  not  been  the  case,  as we  shall 
demonstrate.  The  nature  of  working  time  is changing  in the  economy.  A larger  and  larger 
proportion  of  the  workforce  deviates  from  working  a “standard  work  week”  and  “standard  work 
year.”  One  in six  workers  now  report  working  part-time  schedules  with  one-quarter  of  these 
doing  so  involuntarily  -- a sign  of  “underemployment.”  At the  same  time,  over  six  percent  of 
workers  now  report  working  at two  or more  jobs,  while  many  seek  as much  overtime  as is 
offered  them. 
The  growing  importance  of  work  hours  as a factor  in total  labor  supply  is revealed  in -14- 
Table  I.  Here  the  total  number  of additional  hours  supplied  the  labor  market  during  the  past 
three  expansionary  cycles  is decomposed  into  four  factors:  (1)  the  growth  in the  civilian 
population  age  16 and  above  (2) changes  in labor  force  participation  (3) changes  in the 
unemployment  rate.  and  (4) changes  in average  weekly  hours  per  worker. 
According  to this  analysis,  somewhere  between  two-fifths  and  half  of the  additional  work 
hours  worked  during  the  past  three  expansionary  periods  were  supplied  as a result  of  simple 
population  growth.  This  increase  in supply  is, of course,  independent  of the  business  cycle.  The 
contributions  of the  other  three  elements,  however,  vary  over  the  cycle  and  have  varied  rather 
dramatically  in their  relative  importance  from  one  period  to the  next.  More  than  a fourth  of  the 
additional  hours  worked  in the  1970’s was  attributed  to increases  in labor  force  participation.  By 
the  1990’s, this  source  accounted  for  less  than  5 percent  of the  total  additional  hours.  After 
decades  of  rising  participation  rates,  particularly  as a result  of  increased  women’s  participation, 
the  trajectory  reached  a plateau  in the  first  years  of the current  recovery.  It has  only  begun  to 
grow  again  at a faster  pace  in  1996 and  1997. 
In sharp  contrast,  the  role  of declining  unemployment  and  even  more  importantly,  average 
weekly  hours,  has  increased  substantially  over  time.  In the  fate  1970’s, less  than  one-fifth  of 
additional  work  time  was  due  to workers  being  called  back  to work  from  unemployment.  By  the 
1990’s, this  single  factor  accounted  for  nearly  a third  of the total  addition  to work  time.  The 
increased  contribution  from  longer  work  weeks  was even  more  significant.  In the  1970’s growth 
cycle,  practically  none  of  the  total  increase  in work  time  was  due  to existing  workers  putting  in 
more  hours.  By the  1990’s, fully  one-sixth  of the  additional  labor  supply  came  from  incumbent 
workers.  Together,  the  combined  contribution  of unemployed  workers  returning  to work  and -15- 
incumbent  workers  putting  in longer  work  weeks  is accounting  for  nearly  half  of  the  increased 
labor  supply  that  is sustaining  non-inflationary  economic  growth  in the early  1990s. 
Back  in the  1970’s, these  two  factors  accounted  for only  about  one-fifth  of  the  total  -- the 
rest  coming  from  new  labor  force  participants.  This  is the essence  of the  labor  supply  regime 
shift.  We  are now  obtaining  much  more  labor  supply  from  experienced  workers  rather  than  new 
labor  force  recruits  and  a good  share  of this  added  supply  is forthcoming  when  the  official 
unemployment  rate  signals  little  slack  in the  economy. -16- 
Table  1 
The Sources  of Additional  Hours  of Work  ’ 





Changes  in 
Population 
5 I .O% 
4 I .J% 
4677r 
Changes  in  Labor  Changes  in the  Changes  in  Change  in 
Force  Unemployment  Average  Hours  Total  Hours 
Participation  Rate  Rate  Worked  per  Week  Worked 
27.2%  19.7%  2.2%  I w7o 
lY.7%  24.6%  14.2%  100% 
4.7%  32.0 %  16.6%  100% 
Source:  Economic  Report  of the  President  (1987;  1997);  Special  tabulations  on  hours  from  Currerrt  Pupdahm 
SfU-iYY  data. 
’  This  analysis  was  carried  out  by decomposing  the  changes  in total  hours  of  work 
according  to the  following  formulas: 
Added  Hours  due  to Changes  in  Population  Growth: 
APop~,(,l))  x  LFPR,  x  (I-UR,)  x (HRSIWorker), 
Added  Hours  due  to Changes  in  the  Labor  Force  Participation  Rate: 
ALFPR,,-(,  I ))  x Pop,  x (l-UR,)  x (HRSIWorker), 
Added  Hours  due  to Changes  in the Unemployment  Rate: 
A( I -UR)(,_ur,,  x Pop,  x LFPR,  x (HRSAVorker), 
Added  Hours  due  to Changes  in Hours  Worked  per  Worker: 
h(HRS/Worker)(,(,_,,,  x Pop,  x LFPR,  x (I-UR), 
where:  Pop  = Civilian  noninstitutional  population 
LFPR  = Labor  Force  Participation  Rate 
UR  = Unemployment  Rate 
HRS/Worker  = Average  Annual  Hours  worked  per  worker -17- 
The  Sources  of Labor  Supply  and  NAIRU 
It is reasonable  to ask  why  we  are now  seeing  so much  more  labor  effort  forthcoming 
from  incumbent  workers.  A combination  of standard  labor  supply  theory  and  the  current 
environment  of stagnating  wage  rates  and job  insecurity  explains  a large  part  of this  behavior. 
By tradition,  normally  we  draw  the  supply  curve  for  labor  as upward  sloping  as  we do  the 
supply  curves  of  traditional  goods  and  services.  But  the  labor  supply  curve  is, in fact, 
fundamentally  different  and  can  actually  bend  backwards.  The  offer  of higher  wages  can,  under 
realistic  conditions,  reduce  the  supply  of labor  while  lower  wages  can  increase  it.  This  is well 
known  among  labor  economists  and  is due  to the  fact  that  supply  is influenced  by both  income 
and  substitution  effects.  Increases  in income  per  se induce  a worker  to consume  more  leisure, 
thereby  reducing  the  willingness  to work.  This  is the  income  effect.4 
Where  an increase  in income  comes  as a result  of an increase  in one’s  pay  rate,  there  is 
both  an income  effect  -- because  the  higher  wage  rate provides  a higher  income  at the  same  hours 
of  work  -- and  a substitution  effect  because  an hour  of  leisure  is now  more  expensive.  An 
additional  hour  of  leisure  can  only  be purchased  at a higher  price  -- the  foregone  income  from  the 
new  higher  wage  rate.  In this  case,  the  income  effect  leads  the  worker  to work  less  while  the 
substitution  effect  leads  the  worker  to want  to work  more.  Depending  on  the  relative  strength  of 
the  two  effects,  an increase  in the  wage  rate can  increase  labor  supply,  reduce  it, or  leave  it 
unchanged. 
Normally,  we  think  of  the  substitution  effect  dominating  the  income  effect.  This  is what 
4 The  textbook  example  is of the  worker  who  wins  a multimillion  dollar  prize  in a state 
lottery.  His  wage  remains  unchanged,  but  his  income  rises  significantly.  Often,  such 
prizewinners  will  choose  to cut  back  on  work  hours,  at least  temporarily. gives  us the  usual-shaped  labor  supply  curve  and  the expectation  that  higher  wages  are  needed  to 
coax  out  more  labor  from  “leisure”  time  activities.  There  are at least  two  cases,  however,  where 
-18- 
it is possible  to obtain  increased  labor  supply  without  a concomitant  increase  in wage  rates.  The 
first  involves  “target  income”  or “target  consumption”  behavior.  In cases  where  individuals 
work  in order  to meet  a fixed  income  or consumption  level,  labor  supply  will  be irzverselv related 
to the  wage  rate.  Offered  a higher  wage  rate,  a worker  will  cut  back  his  or her  hours  taking  the 
gain  in the  form  of  leisure.  In this  case,  there  is a pure  income  effect.  Similarly,  if the  wage  rate 
falls,  the  worker  will  have  to work  more  hours  to compensate  for  the  lower  pay  rate.  Hence, 
stagnating  or  falling  wages  in the  face  of  fixed  mortgage  payments,  car payments,  and 
outstanding  credit  card  balances  will  force  workers  to put  in more  hours  at work,  not  less. 
The  second  case  involves  job  insecurity  or at least  the  expectation  of job  insecurity. 
Assuming  that  individuals  have  some  long-run  income  objective,  they  will  alter  their  hours  of 
work  to compensate  for periods  when  they  might  face  layoff  or involuntary  part-time  hours. 
Hence,  if workers  fear  a future  layoff,  they  might  attempt  to increase  their  current  work  hours  in 
order  to set  aside  a cushion  against  future  loss.  Overtime  work  or “moonlighting”  is therefore  a 
form  of  income  insurance  for  workers  facing  potentially  unstable  work  futures.  Such  individuals 
may  be  willing  to  work  all the  hours  they  are offered  at their  current  wage  rate -  or may  take  on 
second  jobs  at current  or even  lower  wage  rates -  in order  to  accumulate  income  reserves. 
Precisely  when  jobs  are plentiful,  individuals  will  be there  to supply  the  additional  hours  -  even 
at existing  pay  rates. 
We  believe  that  it is precisely  this  type  of labor  force  behavior  that  can  help  explain  the 
change  in labor  supply  regime  we have  identified.  The preconditions  for  a backward  bending -19- 
supply  curve  have  been  developing  for  the past quarter  century  and  have  continued  right  through 
much  of the  1990’s.  Real  hourly  wages  of production  and  nonsupervisory  workers  peaked  in 
1973.  Since  then,  they  have  declined  from  $8.55  (in  1982 dollars)  to $7.13  in  1996 (Council  of 
Economic  Advisers,  1997).  Even  with  the  recent  recovery  of  the  economy,  wages  have 
continued  to  stagnate.  Between  1991 and  February  1997, the  real  average  wage  rose  a total  of 
just  2$ per  hour.  In such  a long-term  wage  climate,  target  income  behavi  jr is likely. 
Similarly,  there  is evidence  that  the  fear of job  insecurity  is on  tht, rise.  Alan  Greenspan 
cites,  for example,  a time-series  survey  of workers  carried  out  at 444  large  companies  by the 
International  Survey  Research  Company.  In  1986, only  20 percent  of  respondents  were 
“frequently  concerned  about  being  laid  off.”  The  comparable  ratio  in  1996 was  46  percent.  No 
more  than  24 percent  of those  working  for  these  companies  were  frequently  worried  about  job 
loss  even  during  the  deep  recessions  of the  1980’s5  Faced  with  such  insecurity,  it is not  unlikely 
that  workers  will  feel  greater  pressure  to take  on  added  work  when  it is available  -  and  will  be 
willing  to do  so even  at their  current  wage  rate.  Again,  we have  Say’s  Law  in reverse  and  the 
conditions  for  non-inflationary  growth  at low  recorded  unemployment  rates. 
But  how  much  have  the  hours  of work  of  incumbent  workers  actually  increased  and  who 
is supplying  them ?  Is there  a sufficient  change  in supply  to permit  us to declare  a shift  in  labor 
supply  regime  ?  We  turn  our  attention  to these  questions  in the  remaining  sections  of  this 
monograph. 
5 Cited  in the  iVe)v York  Times,  February  27,  1997, p. B6 Changes  in Working  Time  in the  U.S. 
-2o- 
In an earlier  paper,  we put  forth  the  claim  that  Americans  are both  “overworked”  and 
“underemployed”  (Bluestone  & Rose,  1997). Our  research  was  motivated  by the  debate  set  off  by 
Juliet  Schor’s  seminal  book,  The  Overworked  An~ericnn.  In it, she  estimated  that  Americans 
worked  an average  of  I63  more  hours  a year  in  1990 than  they  had  in  1970 -  the  equivalent  of 
nearly  an extra  month  of  full-time  equivalent  work  (Schor,  1991).  Men  were  working  two  and  a 
half  more  weeks  per  year;  women  an average  of seven  and  half  more  weeks.  This  increase 
reversed  over  a century  of declining  working  time.  American  workers  were  now  putting  in more 
work  in on  a yearly  basis  than  workers  in any other  advanced  economy.6 
Many  researchers  criticized  Schor’s  view  by citing  other  labor  market  indicators  which 
seemed  to be signaling  that  working  time  was  really  decreasing,  and  not  necessarily  voluntarily. 
For  example,  employer  surveys  -  the  very  ones  the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  use  to  measure 
weekly  hours  when  it reports  the  monthly  unemployment  rate -  show  weekly  hours  in 
manufacturing  and  weekly  hours  in the  rest of the  economy  going  in opposite  directions.  It is 
clear  that  in much  of  manufacturing,  the  use  of overtime  is becoming  the  norm.  For  the  first  four 
out  of  five  post-World  War  II business  cycles,  average  weekly  hours  of  work  for  production  and 
nonsupervisory  workers  in manufacturing  remained  roughly  constant,  varying  only  slightly 
between  40. I and  40.4  hours.  However,  during  the current  business  cycle  (1989-  1996),  the 
average  workweek  has jumped  to 4 I .O hours  -- with  average  overtime  reaching  a post-World 
According  to a recent  survey  by the  British  news  magazine,  The  Economist,  Americans 
have  now  surpassed  even  the  Japanese  in annual  work  time  and  toil  15 percent  longer  than  the 
typical  German.  See  “Workaholics  Anonymous:  Why  do  Americans  work  so hard?”  The 
Ecorwm%,  October  22,  1994, p. 20. -21- 
War  II peak  of 4.7  hours  per  week  in  1994 (Council  of Economic  Advisers,  1997). 
Yet,  manufacturing  seems  to the  be the odd  man  out.  Across  all  inlustries,  the  number 
of  weekly  hours  on  the  typical  job  has  been  shrinking  steadily  since  World  War  II as Table  2 
demonstrates.  In the  period  1947-1958  the  average  work week was nearly 40 hours, the “full- 
time”  standard  for  much  of this  century.  In the  most  recent  business  cyc  e, the  average  work 
week  fell  below  35 hours,  the  cutoff  normally  used  to define  a “part-timt:”  job. 
Table  2 
Average  Weekly  Hours 
Total  Private  Sector  Employment 
1947-1958  39.5 
1959-1972  38.2 
1973-1978  36.2 
1979-1988  35.0 
I989-  1996  34.5 
Source:  Council  of Economic  Advisers,  Economic  Report  of the President,  1987, 
Table  B-4 1 and  Council  of Economic  Advisers,  Economic  Report  oj’the 
President,  1996,  Table  B-43. 
Much  of this  is due  to the  growth  in such  sectors  as retail  trade  where  part-time  hours  are 
common.  Added  to this  is the  fact  one  of  the  very  fastest  growing  sectors  over  the  last  15 years 
has  been  employment  in temporary  help  agencies.  These  jobs  along  with  the  increased  use  of 
“contract  employees”  and  other  forms  of  “contingent”work  are responsible  for  the  reported 
shortening  of the  work  week  (Belous  1989; Tilly  1997). -22- 
One  estimate  for  1988 places  the  number  of contingent  workers  (part-time,  temporary, 
and  contract  workers)  at between  29.9  and  36.6  million  or between  25 and  30 percent  of  the 
civilian  labor  force  (Belous,  1989).  In  1996,22  million  workers  (I8  percent  of  labor  force) 
were  part-timers.  working  35 hours  or less  per week.  Smaller  in absolute  numbers,  but  growing 
much  faster.  is the  temporary  workforce  which  between  1982 and  1996 more  than  quadrupled  to 
two  million  workers.  The  number  of contract  and  self-employed  workers  is also  growing  rapidly. 
In a report  completed  in  1991 on  data  for  1985 through  1988, the  U.S.  General  Accounting 
Office  reported  that  the  number  of  individuals  who  were  self-employed  or working  under 
personal  contract  was  growing  at over  13 percent  a year  (as measured  by IRS  1099 Form 
submissions)  (U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  1991).  In  1995,  14 million  Americans  worked  for 
themselves  either  full-time  or as a supplement  to regular  or part-time  employment. 
In addition  to those  with  non-standard  employment  situations,  counting  the  number  of 
unemployed  is not  straightforward.  Beginning  in  1994, the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS) 
began  compiling  a new  set of alternative  measures  of unemployment  and  underemployment  - 
what  the  Labor  Department  calls  “labor  resource  underutilization.”  In addition  to the  official 
unemployment  rate,  the  BLS  adds  three  types  of “underutilized”  workers:  (1) those  who  have 
stopped  looking  for  work  only  because  they  have  become  discouraged  by their  apparent  job 
prospects  (2) those  who  are “marginally  attached”  to the civilian  labor  force,  and  (3) those  who 
are working  part-time  only  because  they  cannot  find  full-time  jobs.  The  “marginally  attached” 
include  those  who  want  and  are available  for a job  and  have  recently  searched  for  work,  but  have 
left  the  official  labor  force  because  of such  constraints  as child  care  or transportation  problems 
(Bregger  & Haugen,  1995). -23- 
The official  unemployment  rate  in  1995 was  5.6 percent  with  an average  of 7.4  million 
failing  to find  work  each  month.  Adding  discouraged  workers  to the  total  brings  the 
“underemployment”  rate  up  to 5.9 percent.  Adding  the  “marginally  attached”  ups  the  rate  to 6.8 
percent.  Finally,  adding  in the  involuntarily  part-time  brings  the  rate to  10.1 percent.  In what 
was  a good  year  for  the  economy  and  employment  growth,  1995, the  total  number  of  unemployed 
and  underemployed  workers  reached  nearly  13.5 million  -  one  in ten  of the  total  labor  force 
(Mishel,  Bernstein  & Schmitt,  1996). 
This  number  is based  on  a point-in-time  snapshot  approach  and  underestimates  the 
number  of people  who  experience  labor  market  distress  over  the  course  of  a single  year.  In  1995, 
when  the  official  unemployment  rate  averaged  5.6 percent,  the  median  length  of  unemployment 
was  eight  weeks.  Different  workers  rotated  through  bouts  of unemployment  with  15 percent  of 
the  labor  force  experiencing  at least  some  official  unemployment.  This  means  that  over  25 
percent  of workers  were  underemployed  during  part  of a year  when  joblessness  was  supposedly 
low. 
When  you  move  from  employer surveys  to employee surveys,  very  different  numbers 
appear,  as Schor  discovered.  Despite  the  boom  in part-time,  contingent,  and  “temp”  work, 
average  hours  per  worker appear  to be  rising  because  of increased  “moonlighting,”  increased 
overtime,  and  because  more  workers,  particularly  women,  are moving  from  part-time  to  full-time 
work  status.  In  1979,4.9  percent  of  U.S.  workers  reported  working  more  than  one job  during  the 
same  work  week.  By  1995, the  percentage  was  up  to 6.4 percent.  Virtually  all of  this  increase 
has  occurred  among  women  who  now  represent  nearly  half  of  the  8 million  multiple  job  holders 
(Mishel,  Bernstein,  & Schmitt,  1996). -24- 
Two  Other  Estimates  of Working  Time 
As some  Americans  are apparently  putting  in very  long  hours  while  others  are facing 
underemployment  due  to the  increase  in part-time  and  contingent  employment,  the  trend  in 
uvernge  work  time  could  conceivably  go  in either  direction.  As such,  our  original  research  found 
that  despite  Juliet  Schor’s  study.  there  remained  a lively  statistical  debate  over  what  was  actually 
happening  to  working  time  in America. 
Using  data  from  the  Current  Population  Survey,  Larry  Mishel  and  Jared  Bernstein  of the 
Economic  Policy  Institute,  re-estimated  annual  work  hours  for various  years.  Their  research 
appears  to confirm  the  general  proposition  of increased  anrzrd  working  hours,  but  for  a 
comparable  period  ( i973-  1992) their  estimate  was  only  three-fifths  as large  as Schor’s  (Mishel  & 
Bernstein,  1994).  They  calculate  that  in  1973, the  average  workweek  (for both  employed  and 
self-employed  workers  in the  public  as well  as the private  sector)  was  38.4  hours.  The  average 
work  year  was  43.2  weeks,  yielding  an annual  estimate  of  1,659 hours  of  work.  By  1992,  the 
average  work  week  had  climbed  by 0.6  hours  while  the  average  work  year  had  increased  to 45.2 
weeks.  Hence.  annual  average  hours  had  risen  to  1,759, an increase  of  100 hours  or 6 percent  -- 
63  hours  less  than  Schor’s  estimate.  Three  quarters  of the  increase,  they  estimated,  could  be 
attributed  to  more  weeks  worked  per  year;  one  quarter  to increased  hours  per  week. 
While  Mishel  and  Bernstein’s  figures  are more  modest,  the  overworked  American  thesis 
faced  stiffer  criticism  from  other  analysts.  Note  that  the  steady  decline  in the  average  workweek 
reported  by employers  as shown  in Table  2 above  suggests  that  there  would  have  to be enormous 
increases  in moonlighting  for  average  hours  per job  to decline  while  average  hours  per  worker 
increases.  This  seems  implausible  for even  after  the  recent  increase  in moonlighting,  only  8 million  workers  out  of  a workforce  of  more  than  125 million  report  multiple  job  holding.  What 
may  be  going  on  here,  say critics,  is that  the  survey  data  used  by Schor  and  by Mishel  and 
-25 
Bernstein  are  unreliable. 
The  estimates  of  hours  worked  in Schor  and  in Mishel  and  Bernstein  are based  on  the 
March  Current  Popularion  Swvey  (CPS)  for each  year.  Among  several  dozen  questions  about 
labor  market  activity,  the  CPS  asks  respondents  to report  “hours  worked  last  week”  and  “usual 
weekly  hours  of  work  last year.”  Individuals  have  only  a few  seconds  to answer  these  questions. 
In making  what  may  be a wild  guess,  particularly  for those  whose  hours  vary  substantially  from 
week  to week,  critics  believe  that  individuals  guess  high.  And  the  more  harried  and  rushed  they 
feel,  the  higher  they  guess. 
An  alternative  measure  of  working  time  is procured  from  special  studies  that  ask 
respondents  to keep  a 24-hour  time  diary  of everything  they  do  over  a one  to two  week  period 
(Robinson  & Bostrom,  1994).  Such  time  diary  surveys  were  first  carried  out  by the  University  of 
Michigan  Survey  Research  Center  in  1965 and  1975 and  then  again  by the  University  of 
Maryland  in  1985.’  The  accuracy  of  work  time  estimates  derived  from  this  survey  approach  is 
presumably  better  than  CPS  measures  for  three  reasons.  Survey  respondents  are required  to 
account  for  every  minute  of the  time  segment  they  are asked  to audit,  formal  work  time  is not 
singled  out  for  special  attention,  and  the  recall  period  is at most  one  or two  days.  Respondents 
do  not  have  to think  back  to what  they  did  a week  ago  or try to  instantly  calculate  how  many 
weeks  they  worked  last  year. 
’  Similar  time  diary  studies  were  carried  out  in the  mid-1960’s  in a number  of  other 
countries  as well  (Szalai,  et.al.,  1972). -26 
Based  on  a comparison  of CPS-estimated  hours  of  work  and  diary  entries,  John  Robinson 
of the  University  of  Maryland  and  Ann  Bostrom  of Georgia  Tech  University  have  found  that  the 
gap  between  hours  reported  using  CPS-type  questions  and  the  hours  reported  in diaries  increases 
as the  number  of  reported  hours  of  work  rises.  Among  those  reporting  20-44  weekly  hours,  the 
CPS-type  estimates  were  only  slightly  higher  than  the  diary  entries.  Among  workers  claiming  to 
“usually”  work  more  than  55 hours  per  week,  the  gap  was  found  to be  10 hours  or more  per 
week.  Values  of  the  CPS-diary  difference  were  generally  found  to be higher  among  women  than 
men.  Robinson  and  Bostrotn  conclude  that  “the diary  data  suggest  that  only  rare  individuals  put 
in more  than  a 55-60  hour  workweek,  with  those  estimating  60 or more  hours  on  the job 
averaging  closer  to 53-hour  weeks.” 
These  results  imply  that  Americans  are not  as overworked  as CPS  estimates  suggest. 
Moreover,  using  the  diary  studies  for  1965,  1975, and  1985, Robinson  and  Bostrom  find  a 
systematic  increase  in the  size  of the  CPS-diary  hours  gap  over  time.  The  gap  rises  from  just  one 
hour  in  I965  to four  hours  in  1975 to 6 hours  in  1985.  This  increase  is more  than  enough  to 
account  for  the  alleged  “overwork”  that  Schor  and  Mishel  and  Bernstein  claim. 
When  the  diaries  for  1965,  1975, and  1985 are analyzed  more  carefully,  Robinson  and 
Bostrorn  find  only  small  changes  in hours  worked  among  those  who  normally  work  20 hours  or 
more  per  week.  Between  1965 and  1985, men’s  average  hours  declined  by 0.7  hours  per  week 
from  47. I  to 46.4  hours.  Working  women’s  hours  increased  by the  same  amount  (0.7)  from  39.9 
to 40.6  hours.  This  would  seem  to suggest  that  working  hours  have  increased  only  modestly. 
How  can  we  reconcile  the  Schor  and  Mishel/Bernstein  findings  with  Robinson  and 
Bostrom?  A large  part  of  the  answer  lies  in the  fact  that  Schor  and  Mishelmernstein  are  looking -27- 
at annA  hours  of  work  and  most  of the  increase  in hours  is due  to  increases  in weeks  worked, 
not  hours  worked  per  week  -  the  focus  of Robinson  and  Bostrom’s  diary  studies.  Indeed, 
according  to Mishel  and  Bernstein,  average  hours  per  week  increased  by just  0.6  hours  between 
1967 and  1992.  However,  average  weeks  worked  per  year  increased  from  43.3  to 45.2  over  this 
period.  Hence.  about  three-fourths  of the  increase  in annual  hours  of work  is accounted  for  by 
increased  weeks  of  work  -  the  factor  ignored  in the  diary  studies. 
New  Estimates  UsinP  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics  (PSIDI 
In our  earlier  work,  we  turned  to still  a third  data  source  to obtain  working  hours 
estimates.  This  was  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  collected  by the  University  of 
Michigan  Survey  Research  Center  since  1968.  Instead  of a snapshot  that  is supposed  to reflect 
the  overall  population  in different  years,  the  PSID  has  been  surveying  the  same  families  and  their 
children  year  after  year.  Part  of  its standard  labor  market  section  is a series  of questions  used  to 
ascertain  annual  hours  of  work.  First,  the  survey  asks  respondents  to detail  their  work  experience 
by  recalling  how  many  days  they  were  on  vacation,  on  sick  leave,  on  strike,  or on  leave  due  to 
other  family  members’  illness.  It then  asks  questions  about  regular  hours  of  work  per  week  and 
weeks  worked  on  the  respondent’s  main  job.  It poses  the  same  questions  concerning  up  to  three 
other  jobs  held  during  the  year.  Finally,  all of this  information  is combined  to yield  an estimate 
of  annual  hours.  Obviously,  this  approach  suffers  from  recall  problems  as is true  of  the  CPS,  but 
the  detail  on  each  job  presumably  permits  a better  estimate  than  we obtain  from  the  CPS  survey. 
These  data  can  be used  in two  fashions.  First,  because  of  the  greater  detail  on  annual 
working  time,  we  can  presumably  compute  better  estimates  of yearly  working  hours  than  we  can -2% 
with  the  CPS.  Second.  the  longitudinal  aspect  of the  PSID  offers  a unique  opportunity  to  trace 
the  year-to-year  variations  of  individual  workers  over  a ten-year  period.  Further,  because  the 
PSID  started  so long  ago,  we can  compare  the histories  of working  time  during  two  ten-year 
periods  -- the  “Seventies”  ( 1969- 1979) and  the  “Eighties”  ( 1979- I989),  each  encompassing  two 
complete  business  cycles.  For  each  of these  approaches,  demographic  information  is available  so 
that  we could  track  trends  in annual  work  hours  for  men  and  women,  whites  and  btacks,  and  for 
segments  of  the  population  with  differing  amounts  of schooling. 
Using  the  PSID  as a series  of cross  sections,  we computed  the  average  hours  of  work  in 
each  year  from  1967 through  1989 for prime  age workers  (age  25-54).  In this  case,  the  sample 
individuals  in each  year  vary  as younger  individuals  enter  the  prime  age  group  and  aging  workers 
leave  it.  We  limited  our  sample  in each  year  to those  who  reported  hours  of  work,  eliminating 
those  from  consideration  who  were  out  of the  labor  force  in a given  year.  Separate  estimates 
were  run  for men  and  women,  and  by race  and  by education.  Chart  2 provides  the  results  for  all 
prime  age  workers. -29- 
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From  the  chart  itself,  there  was  clear  evidence  of variation  related  to the  business  cycle. 
Average  hours  dipped  sharply  in  1970-7 1, in  1975, and  then  again  during  the  steep  198 I-82 
recession.  But  overwhelming  the  business  cycle  was  a U-shaped  long-run  trend  in hours  of 
work.  Average  hours  declined  through  the  early  1980’s and  then  began  a sharp  recovery 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  decade.  When  we compared  1979 and  1989, the  last  two  business 
cycle  peaks,  it appeared  that  there  had  been  an increase  of 79 hours  per  year  for  the  average 
worker.8  But  over  a longer  period,  this  increase  marked  not  so much  a startling  increase  as a 
* This  result  is almost  identical  to the  1979-89  increase  reported  by Mishel  and  Bernstein. 
Using  the  CPS,  they  find  an 82 hour  increase  in annual  hours  compared  to  our  79.  See  Mishel 
and  Bernstein,  The State  of  Working  America  199495,  Table  3.1,  p.  112. -3o- 
return  to levels  which  prevailed  in the  late  1960s. 
To  obtain  a more  accurate  estimate  of the trend  in hours  -  one  that  controls  for  the 
business  cycle.  we  ran regressions  where  a time  trend  and  the  unemployment  rate  were  regressed 
on  annual  hours  of work  for the  entire  1967 to  1989 period.’  The  results  for  the  all worker 
regression  as well  as those  for  various  subgroups  are found  in Table  3.  According  to the 
regression,  after  controlling  for the  business  cycle,  there  is a small,  statistically  significant, 
overall  upward  trend  in annual  hours  for prime  age  workers  as a group.  The  trend  amounts  to 
only  3.3 hours  per  year.  Hence,  over  a twenty-year  period,  we found  a 66 hour  increase  in annual 
work  -- the  equivalent  of  1.5 FTE  weeks  per year.  This  is well  below  Schor’s  estimate  of  163 
hours  and  a third  below  that  of  Mishel  and  Bernstein.  Nonetheless,  the  trend  is decidedly  upward 
in contrast  to what  is essentially  the  flat  line  Robinson  and  Bostrom  find  for  the  1965-1985 
period  using  the  diary  method. 
9  Because  of  autocorrelation,  these  regressions  were  run  using  the  Cochran-Orcutt 
transformation.  OLS  regressions  for  the  groups  reported  in Table  2 generated  Durbin-Watson 
statistics  that  ranged  from  .89 (white  female  regression)  to  1.62 (black  male  regression). -31- 
Table  3 
Estimates”  of  the Time  Trend  in  Hours  Worked 
Prime  Age  Workers,  1967-1989 
-[  All  Men  Women  Etne  Bla;J  gz;n  GJiacfn 
Year  3.30 I  -2.642  18.810  -2.060  -7.735  20.52  I  10.735 
(3.79)  (2.97)  ( 15.50)  (2.23)  (5.55)  (15.31)  (4.18) 
Unemployme  -20.67  -23.74  -8.694  -23.304  -33.003  -9.660  -2.25 1 
nt  Rate  (6.369)  (7.15)  (2.35)  (6.62)  (5.80)  (2.44)  (0.79) 
Constant  1773.0  2599.9  55.3  2574.4  2860.0  -86.8  733.2 
Adjusted  R2  .659  .808  .919  .773  .863  .9t7 
N  22  22  22  22  22  22 
a  Cochran-Orcutt  transformed  regression  estimates. 
t-statistics  in ( ) 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based on data from the Panel Study on Income  Dynamics. 
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Our  method  also  detected  sharp  differences  in work  hour  trends  for  men  and  women. 
Among  men,  the  trend  was  found  to be slightly  negative  after  controlling  for  the  business  cycle. 
Over  a twenty-year  period,  the  regression  model  projected  a 53 hour  decline  in cycle-adjusted 
annual  hours  -just  a bit  steeper  than  the  Johnson-Bostrom  diary  estimate  of  36 hours  (but 
clearly  in the  opposite  direction  from  Schor’s  positive  trend  estimate.)“’  For  women,  the  trend  is 
strongly  positive.  Indeed,  our  estimate  of  18.8 additional  hours  per year  translated  into  a 20 year 
”  Robinson-Bostrom’s  diary  estimates  for  men  for  1965 and  1985 are 47. I  and  46.4 
weekly  hours,  respectively.  Multiplying  the  difference  between  these  two  estimates  by 52 yields 
36.4  annual  hours. -32- 
total  somewhat  greater  than  even  Schor’s  estimate  -  9.4 FTE  weeks  vs. 7.5  FTE  weeks.  It 
should  also  be noted  that  working  women’s  hours  were  increasing  at the  same  time  a higher 
percentage  of  the  total  paid  workforce  was comprised  of  women. 
We  also  found  significant  differences  in the  hours  trajectories  by race.  Reflecting  trends 
well-documented  elsewhere.  our  point  estimate  of a decline  of  7.7 hours  per  year  for  black  men 
translated  into  an average  work  year  in the  late  1980s  more  than  150 hours  shorter  than  in the 
late  1960s.  For  1989, we  estimated  that  black  men  averaged  only  1,950  hours  per  year  compared 
with  just  under  2.300  hours  for  white  men.  Higher  unemployment  rates  were  responsible  for  part 
of  this  difference.  Shorter  work  weeks  explain  the  remainder.” 
The  racial  gap  in hours  worked  among  women  revealed  an 
annual  basis,  there  appeared  to have  been  virtually  no gap  in work 
intriguing  time  pattern.  On  an 
hours  in  1967.  The  gap  then 
widened  significantly  so that  by the  mid-1970s  black  women  were  working  almost  200  hours 
more  per  year  than  white  women.  White  women  caught  up  again  so that  by  1989 white  and  black 
women  were  working  virtually  the  same  amount.  To  close  the  gap,  white  women’s  cycle- 
adjusted  hours  had  to rise  substantially  faster  than  that  of black  women.  This  is precisely  what 
happened  as the  entries  in Table  3 demonstrate.  Over  twenty  years,  white  women’s  annual  hours 
increased  by the  equivalent  of  10.3 FTE  weeks,  nearly  double  the  5.4 FTE  weeks  for  black 
women. 
”  In  1989. the  average  white  unemployment  rate was  4.5%  while  the  black  rate  was 
1 I .4%.  On  average,  then,  whites  experienced  (52*.045*40)  = 93.6  hours  a year  of  lost  work  due 
to unemployment.  By the  same  calc,ulation,  blacks  experienced  237  hours  of  lost  work.  The 
difference  (143.4  hours)  accounts  for just  (143/350)  = 41 percent  of the  difference  in annual 
hours  between  white  and  black  men.  The  remainder,  approximately  2 10 hours,  must  be due  to 
shorter  work  weeks  with  black  men  working  roughly  4 hours  per  week  less  than  white  men  after 
accounting  for  differences  in unemployment. -33- 
Familv  WorkinP  Time 
We  also  investigated  what  had  happened  to family  work  time  and  family  earnings.  In this 
case,  we began  by estimating  the  combined  hours  of  work  for  “prime  age”  families  in which  both 
husband  and  wife  are working.”  The  long  term  trend  is shown  in Chart  3.  There  was,  as 
expected,  a clear  and  nearly  unbroken  trend  toward  much  greater  work  effort,  interrupted  only 
modestly  by the  recessions  of  I97 1, 1974-75,  and  I980-  1982.  By  1988, prime  age  working 
couples  were  putting  in an average  of  3,450  hours  per  year  in combined  employment,  up  from 
2,850  two  decades  before.13 
‘* This  analysis  is limited  to intact  husband-wife  families  in which  the  husband  is “prime 
age”  (age  2.5-54) and  in which  both  husband  and  wife  worked  at least  one  hour  in the  survey 
year. 
”  Because  of  incomplete  family  hours  and  earnings  data  for  1989 in the  PSID  we  used 
for conducting  this  study,  the  following  analysis  is done  for the  period  ending  in  1988. -34- 
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As  before,  we  used  regression  analysis  to calculate  business  cycle  adjusted  hours.  These 
are  found  in Table  4.  According  to the  regression  for  all husband-wife  working  couples,  family 
work  effort  increased  by more  than  32 hours  per  year during  the  1970’s and  1980’s -- the 
equivalent  of adding  nearly  another  month  of full-time  work  effort  ever?, five  years  ( I60  hours). 
Hence,  in the  span  of just  two  decades,  working  husband-wife  couples  increased  their  arzrzuul 
market  work  input  by a cycle-adjusted  684  hours  orfollr  months  of full-time  work.  Put  plainly, -35 
the  typical  dual  earner  couple  at the  end  of  the  1980’s was  spending  an additional  day  and  half  on 
the job  eveq  week.  We  concluded  that  “if  individuals  are not  more  overworked  than  before, 
families  certainly  seem  to be.” 
Table  4 
Estimates”  of the  Time  Trend  in Hours  Worked 
Prime  Age  Husband-Wife  Couples,  1967-1988 
-1  All  White  Black  urgIuts  I$zds  :;I 
Year  34.212  35.140  22.778  24.474  32.968  32.586 
(24.24)  (25.3 I)  (9.80)  (7.25)  (15.41)  ( 7.69) 
Unemployme  -36.87  -37.24  -3 1.78  -49.39  -48.39  -44.54 
nt Rate  (7.10)  (7.26)  (3.68)  (4.12)  (6.16)  (4.36) 
Constant  652.7  591.7  1450.9  1317.5  826.4  924.8 





Adjusted  R2  .969  .972  .83 1  .7 18  .924  .766  .958 
N  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
’ Cochran-Orcutt  transformed  regression  estimates.  t-statistics  in ( ) 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on data  from  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics. 
Increases  in  family  work  effort  were  found  to differ  significantly  by race  and  by 
education.  The  increase  in working  hours  among  white  working  couples  was  sixty  percent  larger 
than  the  increase  for  black  couples  -  a reflection  of  both  the  sharp  decline  in black  men’s  hours 
and  the  large  increase  in white  female  work  effort.  More  educated  working  couples  also 
increased  their  work  effort  more  than  those  with  less  schooling.  Those  in which  the  husband  had 
at least  a four-year  college  degree  increased  their  combined  work  effort  by nearly  730  hours -36- 
compared  to an  increase  of  only  490  hours  for couples  headed  by a high  school  dropout. 
How  much  had  this  enormous  increase  in work  effort  paid  off  in terms  of  increased 
family  earnings‘?  The  results  for this  inquiry  are found  in Table  5.  Here  we  had  estimated  the 
percentage  growth  in real  combined  earnings  and compared  it to the  growth  in combined  work 
hours  for  the  period  1973 to  1988.” 
Table  5 
Percentage  Growth  in Annual  Hours  Worked  vs. 
Percentage  Growth  in Annual  Earnings 
Prime  Age  Working  Husband-Wife  Couples 
1973-1988 
White  Black 
17.1  11.8 
19.8  15.8 
2.2  3.6 
HS  HS  Some  BA+ 
Dropouts  Grads  College 
11.6  16.1  17.4  16.6 
-8.2  3.7  3.8  32.5 
-17.7  -10.7  -11.5  13.6 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on data  from  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics 
For  prime  age  working  couples  as a group,  combined  real earnings  rose  by  18.5 percent 
between  1973 and  1988.  (This  represents  an increase  from  $43,851  to $51,955  in  1991 dollars). 
These  families  saw  their  material  standard  of living  increase  by just  a little  bit better  than  1 
percent  per  year.  Most  of this  modest  increase,  however,  did  not  come  from  improved  wages, 
but  flom  increased  work  effort.  The  18.5  percent  increase  in real  earnings  was purchased  with u 
”  The  year  1973 was  chosen  as the  base  year  for this  analysis  for that  year  represents  the 
end  of the  postwar  boom  in real  average  hourly  wages. -37- 
16.3  percent  increase  in hours  worked.  Over  the entire  sixteen  year  period,  the  combined 
average  husband-wife  hourf_v wage  increased  by only  1.8 percent  -  the  equivalent  of  a real 
hourly  wage  increase  of  less  than  2 cents  each  year!  Schor’s  depiction  of  workers  imprisoned  in 
“capitalism’s  squirrel  cage”  does  not  appear  to be far off  the  mark.  From  a purely  material 
perspective,  the  “average”  working  family  with  two  earners  appears  to have  been  able  to  increase 
its consumption  over  time,  but  only  by working  much  longer  and  harder  to enjoy  what  is 
basically  a modest  improvement  in the  amount  of goods  and  services  they  can  buy.  The  story  is 
much  the  same  for  both  white  and  black  families  with  real earnings  rising,  but  chiefly  because  of 
increased  work  effort. 
However,  when  the  data  were  disaggregated  by education  group,  we  found  an even  more 
telling  story  than  that  of  workers  sacrificing  family  time  in  order  to indulge  in  a cornucopia  of 
material  consumption.  For  all families  -- with  the  notable  exception  of those  headed  by a worker 
with  at least  a college  degree  -- the  enormous  increase  in work  effort  over  the  past  twenty  years 
has  accomplished  no  more  than  to allow  families  to maintain  their  olrl standard  of  living.  For 
high  school  dropout  families,  the  situation  has been  even  tougher.  Between  1973 and  1988,  these 
families  increased  their  annual  work  effort  by nearly  12 percent  yet  ended  up  with  8 percent  less 
annual  income.  For  families  headed  by high  school  graduates  or some  college,  work  effort  was 
up  by  16 to  17.4 percent.  All  of these  added  hours  of  work  left  such  families  with  less  than  a 4 
percent  increase  in total  earnings.  These  families,  we concluded,  were  trapped  in an Alice  in 
Wonderland  world  running  faster  and  faster just  to stay  in the  same  place.  For  all of these 
families,  the  “family”  hourly  wage  has  fallen  precipitously,  by as much  as  I7 percent  in the  case 
of  the  high  school  dropout. -38- 
The  one  great  exception  to the  Alice  in Wonderland  world  was  found  among  families 
headed  by a college  graduate.  These  families  increased  their  work  effort  by about  the  same 
percentage  as those  headed  by high  school  graduates  or those  with  some  college.  But  this  added 
work  effort  paid  off,  permitting  their  material  consumption  standard  to increase  by nearly  a full 
third  between  1973 and  1988.  In this  one  case,  hard  work  apparently  has  its reward. 
Unfortunately.  such  well-educated  families  comprise  less  than  a third  (31%)  of all families. 
The  Recent  Trend  in Work  Hours:  What  Has Happened  to Work  Time  Since  1989? 
Since  the  appearance  of our  earlier  work,  we have  turned  to Current  Population  Survey 
data  to  investigate  the  trend  in hours  worked  since  1989.15 Did  the  trend  in increased  hours 
continue  as the  economy  recovered  in the  1990’s or did  it once  again  decline  as it had  between 
1967 and  1982? 
The  first  task  was  to compare  annual  hours  estimates  from  the  two  data  sources  we  have 
been  using.  The  questions  asked  in the  CPS  and  the  PSID  to ascertain  work  hours  are  not 
identical.  Yet,  we  found  such  a close  correspondence  between  the  two  data  series  that  in this 
new  work  we  feel  confident  in using  the  CPS  as the  basis  for estimating  working  time  (see  Chart 
4) and  in some  cases,  we  have  concatenated  the  two  files  in order  to produce  a full  1967-1995 
data  series.16 
”  This  was  necessary  because  our  version  of  the  PSID  contains  data  only  through  1989. 
”  In these  concatenated  analyses,  hours  estimates  for  1967- 1974 are from  the  PSID  and 
those  from  I975  through  1995 are from  the  CPS. -39- 
Chart  4 
Average  Annual  Hours  of Work 
All  Prime  Age  Workers  (Age  25-54) 
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-m-  ALL - CPS +  ALL - PSI0 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on CPS  and  PSID  data. 
We  focus  our  initial  analysis  on  the  prime  age  workforce,  in line  with  our  previous 
research.  Chart  5 reproduces  Chart  2, adding  the  data  for the  most  recent  period.  It shows,  as 
before,  the  trend  -  or  more  accurately  -  the  two  trends  in annual  work  hours  since  the  late 
1960’s.  While  there  is a clear  cyclical  component  in the  data,  it shows  the  sharp  decline  in annual 
hours  from  1967 through  1982 and  after  then  the even  sharper  monotonic  increase  through  the 
business  cycle  peak  in  1989.  What  we  now  know  from  Chart  5 is that  following  a brief  dip 
during  the  1990-199  I  recession,  the  growth  in hours  began  to climb  again.  In  1995, average 
annual  hours  reached  a new  peak,  surpassing  its  1967 level.  Since  the  lust  h~tsiness  cyle  peak  in -4o- 
1989,  arzmal  hours  have  increased  by another  32  hours  -  a  1.6 percertt  increase  in labor  supply 
front  irtcwnbent  bvorkers. 
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Source:  PSID  1967-1974;  CPS  1975-1995 
Charts  6 and  7 depict  the  same  trends  by gender.  These  results  suggest  that  from  1967 
through  1982,  the  overall  decline  in annual  hours  was  due  to a collapse  in men’s  hours  that  could 
not  be fully  offset  by increases  in those  of  women.  After  1982,  however,  even  men’s  hours 
began  to  increase  and  they  continued  to right  through  the  1989-1995  period.  Since  1989,  the 
average  men’s  work  year  has  increased  by  18 hours  -  nearly  half  an FTE  work  week  or 0.8 -41- 
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per  cent  while  women’s  annual  hours  continued  to increase  at a rapid  pace.  Just  between  1989 
and  1995, the  average  work  year  for  women  increased  by 57 hours  -  3.3  percent.  Note  also  the 
sharp  cyclical  recovery  in men’s  hours  since  the recession  of  1991-92. 
Changes  in annual  hours  can  be decomposed  into  two  components  -  changes  in annual 
weeks  worked  and  changes  in average  hours  worked  per  week.  The  former  includes  the  effect  of 
changes  in the  official  unemployment  rate  while  the  latter  does  not.  As  we  have  measured  them 
here,  weekly  hours  are estimated  only  for  those  who  are already  counted  as employed.  Chart  8 
shows  the  increase  in average  work  weeks.  Note  that  in  1979, when  the  unemployment  rate  was 
5.8  percent.  prime  age  workers  averaged  46.0  weeks  of work  per  year.  In  1987,  when  the jobless 
rate  was  6.2  percent,  the  average  work  year  was nevertheless  longer  -  about  46.8  weeks.  Thus, 
by  1987, a portion  of the  overall  labor  supply  “lost”  to unemployment  was  being  made  up  by the 
fact  that  those  who  were  working  were  spending  more  weeks  in the  labor  market. 
More  important  for unraveling  the  mystery  of  low  unemployment  and  low  inflation  is 
what  we  have  found  regarding  average  weekly  hours.  Chart  9 shows  the  trend  for  prime  age 
workers  since  1975.  Of particular  note  is the  remarkably  different  pattern  following  the 
recessions  of  1975,  I98 I-82,  and  199 1.  Average  weekly  hours  rose  between  1975 and  1978,  but 
fell  back  to their  1975 level  by  1979.  Essentially,  there  was  no  added  labor  supply  coming  from 
incumbent  prime  age  workers  during  this  strong  economic  recovery.  In the  last  two  recoveries, 
however,  average  weekly  hours  have  climbed  dramatically  as indicated  by the  superimposed 
slopes  in this  chart. -43- 
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Increased  Work  Effort  in Total  Workforce 
To  this  point,  we  have  focused  attention  on  the  prime  age  workforce,  age  25-54,  in order 
to compare  recent  trends  with  the  ones  we  investigated  in our  original  research  in this  field.  Our 
previous  work  had  used  this  age group  so as to assure  that  estimates  of changes  in working  time 
were  independent  of changes  in the  age  composition  of the  workforce.’  For  present  purposes, 
however,  we  are  interested  in work  time  trends  among  all workers  for  this  is the  relevant  variable 
for  studies  of the  macro  economy.  Moreover,  to accomplish  the  hours  decomposition  we 
reported  in Table  I,  our  attention  is drawn  to average  weekly  hours  instead  of annual  hours  or 
average  weeks  worked. 
The  results  of our  CPS  analysis  are found  in Charts  IO- 14. 
1975- I995  trend  in weekly  hours  for all workers  age  16 and  older. 
The  first  of these  provides  the 
It bears  a close  resemblance 
to the  trend  for prime  age  workers.  Weekly  hours  have  expanded  from  a low  of 37.6  in  1982 to a 
present  level  of close  to 39.0.  From  a labor  supply  perspective,  this  is the  equivalent  of 
increasing  the  size  of  the  working  population  over  this  13 year  period  by 3.7 percent.  Given  that 
the  workforce  was just  about  100 million  strong  in  1982, this  increase  in weekly  hours  represents 
about  the  same  addition  to labor  supply  as adding  3.7 million  new  workers  to the  total  workforce 
-  or reducing  the  official  unemployment  rate by 3.7 percentage  points.  Between  1982 and 
I7 Age  composition  affects  estimates  of average  working  time  because  of  the  reduced 
hours  put  in by both  younger  workers  and  older  workers.  Younger  workers  are more  likely  to 
mix  work  with  school  and  therefore  a larger  proportion  will  be working  part-time  hours. 
Workers  in their  pre-retirement  years  are likely  to cut  back  hours  and  therefore  also  affect  overall 
hours  estimates.  Therefore,  as the  age  profile  of the  working  population  changes,  there  will 
naturally  be a change  in hours  worked  unrelated  to changes  in labor  supply  regime.  By 
measuring  the  labor  supply  of prime  age  workers,  we held  the  demographic  profile  fixed  over  the 
time  series  we  investigated. -45- 
1995,  the  workforce  as conventionally  measured  increased  by 25.4  million.  Hence,  the  increase 
in weekly  hours  among  incumbent  workers  was equivalent  to about  15 percent  of  the  hours 
available  from  new  workers.  This  is hardly  a trivial  amount. 
Chart  10 
Average  Weekly  Hours 
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The  weekly  hours  trends  for  the  past  three  recoveries  are also  depicted  in this  chart.  Note 
that  in the  1975-79  recovery,  weekly  hours  increased  by only  .05 hours  per  year.  In the 
subsequent  recovery  (1982-89),  the  rate  increased  to  , I3  hours  per  year.  Finally,  in the  current 
recovery,  weekly  work  time  has  been  rising  at .16  hours  per  year.  This  is the  best  evidence  of  a 
labor  supply  regime  change. 
Charts  11 and  12 depict  these  weekly  hours  trends  for  men  and  women  separately.  The -46- 
hours  recovery  for  men  since  1982  is particularly  noteworthy.  By  1995, the  average  workweek 
was  back  up to the  peak  level  reached  in  1979 -  41.7  hours.  Moreover,  the  rate  of  increase  has 
grown  over  the  last three  recoveries.  In the  current  recovery,  weekly  hours  are  increasing  by 2110 
of  an hour  per  year,  about  double  the  rate  during  the  1970’s expansion. 
For  women,  there  has  been  a nearly  continuous  increase  in weekly  hours.  Despite  reports 
of  women  reaching  a plateau  in terms  of  labor  force  participation  and  workforce  attachment,  the 
shift  from  part-time  to full-time  work  seems  to be as strong  as at any  time  over  the  past  twenty 
years.  In  1975,  women  averaged  33.9  hours  per  week.  During  the  1975-1979  economic 
recovery,  they  increased  their  weekly  hours  at a rate of  .076  hours  per  year.  At that  pace,  by 
1995, they  would  have  been  working  35.4  hours  per  week.  Ln actuality,  they  were  working  even 
more  -  35.8  hours. 
There  is a distinct  racial  and  ethnic  pattern  to the  weekly  hours  trend  as well.  As  Chart  13 
demonstrates,  non-Hispanic  whites,  non-Hispanic  blacks,  and  Hispanics  have  all seen  increases 
in the  length  of their  work  weeks,  but  at different  rates.  Whites  still  work  the  longest  work  week, 
but  the  gap  between  whites  and  blacks  is closing  -- in contrast  to the  annual  hours  patterns  for 
prime  age  workers.  In  1975,  whites  worked  1.6 hours  more  per  week  than  blacks;  by  1995,  the 
gap  had  closed  by nearly  half  to  .86 hours.  Hispanics  had  the  slowest  increase  in weekly  hours, 
having  started  out  at the  white  level.  They  kept  pace  with  whites  throughout  most  of  the  period, 
but  began  to  fall  behind  after  1989.  This  may  reflect  recent  immigration  patterns  and,  as we 
shall,  the  role  of education. -47- 
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Chart  13 
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Finally,  Chart  14 shows  the  trend  in weekly  hours  by education  level.  In general.  the 
more  educated  the  worker,  the  longer  the  workweek.  College  educated  workers  averaged  4 1.6 
hours  per  week  in  1995 compared  to only  35.2  hours  for  high  school  dropouts.  High  school 
graduates  and  those  with  1-3 years  of college  fell  near  the  middle  of these  two  extremes.  These 
results  help  explain  the  overall  upward  trend  in weekly  hours.  As the  labor  force  has  become 
better  educated,  a larger  proportion  of the  workforce  falls  into  schooling  categories  which 
normally  work  longer  hours.  By  1995,25  percent  of the  workforce  had  a college  degree.  By 
contrast,  in  1975, only  16.1 percent  was  this  well  educated.  If the  level  of education  had  not -49- 
increased  over  these  twenty  years,  average  work  time  would  have  increased  by only  about  9 
minutes  (from  38.16  to 38.31  hours)  between  1975 and  1995.18 As  is, the  actual  increase  in work 
time  was  48  minutes.  Hence,  more  than  80 percent  of the  long-run  increase  in average  weekly 
hours  over  the  past  twenty  years  can  be associated  with  the  increased  education  level  of  the 
workforce.  Schooling  not  only  contributes  to faster  economic  growth  by improving  labor 
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Ix This  value  was  calculated  by weighting  the  1995 weekly  hours  for  each  education 
group  by the  1975  share  of  the  workforce  in each  of these  education  groups.  The  difference 
between  the  actual  1995 weekly  hours  estimate  and  this  I975  education-weighted  1995 weekly 
hours  estimate  was  then  divided  by the  actual  weekly  hours  increase  between  1975 and  1995. 
This  yields  the  percentage  associated  with  increased  education  level  (80.8%). -5O- 
The  contribution  of  increased  education  to increased  weekly  hours  varies  substantially 
across  the  last three  business  cycles.  During  the  19751979  recovery,  nearly  90 percent  (88.5%) 
of the  small  total  (7 minute)  increase  in the  average  workweek  is associated  with  rising  schooling 
levels.  This  leaves  very  little  of the  increase  to be explained  by other  factors  including  worker 
response  to changing  wage  rates  or expectations  about  job  insecurity.  In the  two  most  recent 
recoveries,  however,  these  other  factors  clearly  dominate.  Only  17.3 percent  of the  65  minute 
total  increase  in weekly  hours  between  1982 and  1989 can  be attributed  to rising  education 
levels.  In the  most  recent  recovery,  only  21.5  percent  of the  total  25 minute  increase  is 
associated  with  schooling.  Thus,  while  over  the long  run,  education  plays  a critical  role  in 
explaining  increased  labor  supply,  in the  short-run  other  factors  seem  to have  been  more 
important. 
Variation  in Working  Time  of  Individuals 
We  now  turn  to the  full  longitudinal  capacity  of the  PSID  to investigate  whether  workers 
are experiencing  less job  stability.  If so,  it is possible  that  workers  voluntarily  work  as much 
overtime  as they  can  when  work  is available  in order  to cushion  the  blow  of depressed  income 
when  joblessness  strikes. 
Working  in a longitudinal  mode  requires  making  a number  of decisions  about  how  to 
classify  individuals  for  their  status  can  change  over  time.  Individuals  marry  and  divorce,  for 
example.  Over  a ten  year  period,  how  should  one  classify  an individual  who  was  single  for  six 
years  and  married  for  four ?  An  individual’s  occupation  and  industry  may  change  over  time.  In 
what  labor  market  categories  should  we place  them?  An  individual’s  income  changes  over  time. -51- 
In what  quintile  should  l/e  place  an  individual?  Essentially,  what  would  be  point  estimates  in 
cross-section  data  becor  te ranges  in longitudinal  data  sets. 
For  our  purpose  here,  we  separate  the  PSID  into  two  ten-year  time  frames  corresponding 
to the  1970’s (I 969- I97  )) and  the  1980’s (I 979- 1989).  Both  of  these  ten-year  periods  had  similar 
growth  rates  in real  out  jut per  person  and  in job  creation  and  each  encompassed  two  complete 
business  cycles.  This  h Aps  make  for an appropriate  comparison.  We  restrict  our  analysis  to 
prime  age  workers  in o  der  to exclude  those  who  would  normally  be moving  from  part-time  work 
to full-time  work  as the v school  and  those  who  might  be moving  from  full-time  work  to part-time 
work  as they  approach  I etirement.  Given  the  longitudinal  nature  of the  data,  we  restrict  our 
analysis  of each  decade  to  individuals  who  began  at age 24 to 48  and  ended  the  decade  aged  34 to 
58. 
Our  first  task  is t I  investigate  continuity  of employment  -- the  ability  to hold  a full-time, 
full-year  job  consistently  over  ten  years.  Let  us define  “strong  continuity”  as working  at least 
1750 hours  (50  weeks  at 35 hours  per  week)  in eight  out  of ten  years  and  never  working  less  than 
1000 hours  in any  single  year.  In the  1970’s, 79 percent  of prime-age  men  met  this  criteria,  but 
only  71 percent  did  in the  1980’s (see  Table  6). 
Various  demographic  groups  had  differing  degrees  of employment  continuity,  but  for 
every  group  except  college  graduates  continuity  declined  between  the  1970s  and  the  1980s.  The 
decline  for  black  prime  age  men  was  the  most  precipitous,  from  73 percent  to 5 1 percent 
indicating  that  nearly  half  of  these  men  either  had  a year  in which  they  worked  less  than  half-time 
(<IO00  hours)  or had  at least  three  years  out  of ten  in which  they  worked  only  part-time  (~35 
hours/week  on  average).  Persistent  low-earners  (based  on their  ten-year  earnings  history  putting -52- 
them  in the  lowest  earnings  quintile)  went  from  over  one  in two  having  strong  continuity  to 
under  one  in three.  Finally,  the  share  of high  school  dropouts  with  strong  attachment  declined 
from  68 to 5 1 percent.  These  declines  show  the added  difficulty  faced  by  the  lower  end  of  the 
male  labor  force  and  are  fully  consistent  with  other  studies  showing  a sharp  deterioration  in the 
labor  market  fortunes  of  less-educated  men  (Mishel,  et al.,  1994; Bluestone,  1990a;  Bluestone, 
1990b;  Levy  & Murnane,  1992). 
Table  6 
“Strong”  Employment  Continuity 
in the  1970’s  and  1980’s  - MEN 
(in percent) 
College  Graduate  +  77  79 
IO-year  Earnings  Quintile 
Lowest  52  30 
Fourth  76  66 
Middle  82  75 
Second  90  87 
Top  94  91 
Source:  Stephen J., On  Shaky  Ground:  Rising  Fears  About  Incomes  and  Earnings,  Wasington, 
D.C.:National  Commission  for Employment  Policy  Report  No.  94-02,  1994  (Rose,  1994). -53- 
For  women,  the  ten-year  approacl  accentuates  the  differences  from  mt n in terms  of  their 
labor  force  attachment  (see  Table  7).  In  .he  1970’s, prime-age  women  as an el tire  group 
averaged  only  870  hours  of  paid  labor  pi r year.  This  level  increased  dramatic  111~  to  1243  hours 
per  year  in the  198Cis  but  still  lagged  cot  siderably  behind  the  male  average  of  over  2 100 hours. 
In terms  of  strong  continuity  -- staying  persistently  in the  labor  force  full-time,  full-year  -- only 
one  in nine  prime-age  women  met  this  criteria  in the  1970’s.  By the  1980’s, t‘iis ratio  had  risen  to 
one  in five.  So,  while  the  increase  war; dramatic,  women’s  persistent  attachr  lent  as measured  by 
our  “strong  continuiry”  indicator,  still  remained  much  lower  than  that  of  me  I. 
Another  way  of measuring  the  degree  of  labor  force  participation  of  prime-age  workers  is 
to define  weak  contin,$ty  as working  full-time,  full-year  in three  or fewer  y ears  and  working  less 
than  1000 hours  in fivl: or more  years.  Only  2 percent  of prime-age  men  ir  the  1970’s had  such 
little  labor  force  activit!!  and  only  4 percent  in the  1980’s.  For  prime-age  w omen  by contrast, 
nearly  three  out  of  five  bad  this  low  level  of  labor  market  participation  in t le  1970’s.  That  is, by 
the  definition  we  have  adopted  here,  nearly  60 percent  of  women  would  be considered  “part- 
time”  in the  1970’s.  Only  a decade  later,  this  proportion  had  shrunk  to 38 percent,  mirroring 
what  is well  known  about  female  labor  force  participation, 
Moreover,  as Table  7 indicates,  the  racial  difference  among  prime-age  women  in labor 
force  continuity  is the  reverse  of that  for  men.  In both  decades,  black  women  have  both  higher 
levels  of  strong  attachment  and  lower  levels  of weak  attachment  to the  labor  market  -- although 
both  gaps  are closing.  In general,  more  educated  women  have  stronger  attachment  as expected -54- 
with  the  one  anomaly  being  the  drop  off  in attachment  among  college-educated  women.” 
Table  7 
“Strong”  and  “Weak”  Employment  Continuity 
in the  1970s  and  1980s  - WOMEN 
(in percent) 
HS Graduate 
Some  College 
College  Grad  + 
Marital  Status 
Never  Married 
Sometimes 
Always  Married 
15  25  56  35 
8  19  48  29 
29  35  33  20 
13  24  45  26 
8  15  67  48 
Source: Stephen  J. Rose,  On  Shaky  Ground:  Risine,  Fears  About  Incomes  and  Earnings, 
Washington,  D.C.:National  Commission  for  Employment  Policy  Report  No.  94-02,  1994. 
i9 At  this  point,  we do  not  have  a good  explanation  for this  finding.  It is possible  that 
this  may  reflect  a contingent  of better  educated  women  who  have  gone  back  to school  during 
their  “prime  working  years”  to complete  additional  education.  Another  possibility  is that  this 
reflects  delayed  child-bearing  among  college  educated  women  and  therefore  more  part-time 
employment  in the  early  prime  working  years. -55 
Marital  status  is important  as expected.  Those  women  who  were  married  in all  ten  years 
of  a decade  had  had  the  lower  persistent  !abor  force  participation  (75 percent  in the  1970’s and  62 
percent  in the  1980’s).  Never  married  women,  by contrast,  were  much  more  likely  to have  strong 
continuity  and  much  less  likely  to have  weak  continuity. 
The  greater  difficulty  that  men  have  been  facing  in maintaining  persistent  employment 
continuity  can  be tied  directly  to changing  business  practices,  particularly  related  to downsizing, 
outsourcing,  and  the  move  to greater  job  contingency.  Using  the  same  ten-year  approach,  we  can 
determine  how  many  prime-age  male  workers  had  a “strong”  connection  with  the  same  employer. 
Defining  strong  career  stability  as changing  employers  in no more than one year out of ten, 67 
percent  of  men  in  1970’s and  only  52 percent  of men  in the  1980’s met  this  criteria  (see  Table  8). 
As  for  weak  connections  to employers  -  defined  as having  four  or more  years  over  a ten-year 
period  in which  a worker  changed  employers-  we find  such  weak  attachment  has  doubled  for 
men  from  I2  percent  to 24 percent  over  the  two  decades.  Clearly  job  stability  has  declined  for 
men. -56- 
Table  8 






Weak  Medium  Strong 
1970s  1980s  1970s  1980s  1970s  1980s 
12  24  21  24  67  52 
12  23  21  25  67  52 
13  34  22  17  65  49 
Educational  Attainment 
HS  Dropout  14 
HS  Grad  IO 
Some  College  I2 
College  Grad  +  II 
39  23  20  63  41 
20  21  21  68  60 
25  21  28  67  47 
18  19  26  70  56 
“Strong  Stability”:  Having  no  more  than  1 year  in  which  the  worker  changed  employers 
“Medium  Stability”:  Having  2-3  years  in  which  the  worker  changed  employers 
“Weak  Stability”:  having  4+  years  in  which  the  worker  changed  employers 
Source:  Stephen  J. Rose.  Declining  Job  Security  and  the  Professionalization  of  Oouortunitv,  Washington, 
DC:  National  Commission  for  Employment  Policy,  Report  No.  9504,1995  (Rose,  1995). 
Job  Stability  and  Working  Time 
We  can  also  explore  the  question  of whether  greater  job  instability  been  accompanied  by 
more  variance  in hours  worked?  In brief,  do  workers  face  a “feast  or famine”  phenomenon  in 
working  time.  Given  that job  instability  is increasing  and  workers  are  forced  to change  jobs 
more  often,  then  it is plausible  that  an increased  perception  or actual  experience  of greater  job 
insecurity  may  induce  individuals  to work  more  hours  when  they  are available  because  they 
realize  that  three  months,  six  months,  or a year or two  from  now  they  likely  face  a period  of  short -57- 
work  hours  or  none  at all.  In this  case,  increased  job  insecurity  could  exl Ilain a number  of  labor 
market  phenomena:  increased  voluntary  overtime,  increased  moonlightir  g; and  higher  rates  of 
underemployment.  Job  instability  may  mean  that  the  same  Americans  a.e  both  overworked  ar~l 
underemployed. 
In order  to verify  this,  we develop  two  methods  to estimate  the  I roportion  of  workers 
who  experience  large  year-to-year  variation  in annual  hours  worked: 
(I)  HiLo  This  statistic  measures  the  proportion  of  individ  lals  in a demographic 
group  who,  during  a decade,  experience  at least  one  year  in which  they 
work  more  than  2,400  hours  and  at least  one  ye.lr of  1,750  hours  or  less. 
The  “Hi”  value  is equivalent  to an average  wor’cweek  of  approximately  46 
hours  or more.  The  “Lo”  value  is equivalent  tc  less  than  3.5 hours  per 
week.  These  cutoffs  were  arbitrarily  set,  but  correspond  to a reasonable 
definitions  of  “overtime”  work  and  “part-time”  work. 
(2)  cv,  This  statistic  is the  coefficient  of variation  (a/z)  of annual  hours  worked 
for  individuals  in each  demographic  group  during  each  decade. 
To  the  degree  that  these  measures  rise  over  time,  we  have  more  circumstantial  evidence  that 
insecurity  is driving  increased  work  time. 
The  results  for  the  HiLo  analysis  for  men  are found  in Table  9. According  to this  analysis, 
among  all prime  age  males,  more  than  28 percent  experienced  substantial  year-to-year  variation 
in hours  worked  during  the  1980s.  Nearly  three  out  of ten  workers  had  at least  one  year  of 
substantial  “overtime”  (>46  hours/week)  and  at least  one  year  of  significant  “underemployment” 
(~35  hours/week)  during  the  1980s.  Compared  to the  197Os, the  proportion  of  such  individuals 
experiencing  such  hours  variation  was  up  by nearly  5 percent. 
For  black  men,  the  incidence  of “HiLo”  variation  is substantially  higher  than  among 
white  men  with  well  more  than  one  third  of all black  men  experiencing  this  type  of “feast  and -58- 
famine”  working  hours.  While  white  men  experience  less  inter-year  variation  in hours  worked, 
over  the  two  decades  they  moved  closer  to the black  average.  In the  1980s  those  who  did  not 
obtain  a high  school  diploma  experienced  more  hours  variation  than  all other  workers.  But  by 
the  far the  strongest  correlates  with  elevated  inter-year  hours  variation  can  be found  in terms  of 
earnings  levels  and  number  of job  changes.  Among  those  with  the  lowest  average  quintile 
earnings.  four  out  of ten  experience  HiLo  hours  variation  -  more  than  double  those  in the  top 
quintile.  Simply  put,  those  who  confront  “feast  and  famine”  work  experience  are more  likely  to 
have  low  average  earnings.  Similarly,  those  who  change  employers  often  face  the  highest  rates 
of  “IliLo”  activity.  More  than  half  of prime  age men  who  change  employers  at least  four  times 
in a decade  end  up  with  years  of overtime  and  years  of underemployment. -59 
Table  9 
“HiLo”  Analysis  of Hours  Variance  for 





least  one  year  >2,400  hours  and 
at least  one  year  <  I.750  hours 
1970s  1980s 
27.3  28.5 
%Differcnce 
4.6% 
I  I 
26.2  I  27.9  6.4 
38.6  I  ~~~  37.2  I  -3.4 
Education  II  I  I 
HS  Dropout  II  30.5  I  38.2  I  25.2 
HS  Graduate 
Some  College 
College  Graduate  + 
Emxitgs  Qiiitrtile 
Lowest  Q 
26.0  24.7  -4.9 
31.3  28.6  -8.6 
22.2  26.6  19.5 
I  I 
I  I 
40.6  I  39.2  I  -3.5 
Fourth  Q  II  40.0  I  37.3  I  -6.0 
Middle  Q 
Second  Q 
Top  Q 





23.5  28.6  21.5 
21.8  21.3  -2.4 
IO.3  16.3  58.0 
18.2  15.5  -15.2 
35.9  33.6  -6.4 
56. I  50.8  -9.4 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  data  from  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics. -6O- 
Which  men  have  experienced  the  greatest  increases  in hours  variation?  According  to 
Table  9, high  school  dropouts,  those  with  at least  a baccalaureate  degree,  and  those  with  the 
highest  ten-year  earnings  had  substantial  rises  in HiLo  activity  between  the  two  decades.  From 
this,  one  might  conjecture  from  these  findings  that  those  with  the  fewest  skills  and  those  in the 
ranks  of  middle  managers  have  been  particular  victims  of downsizing,  but  future  research  with 
the  PSID  is needed  to provide  more  evidence  to test  this  hypothesis. 
The  “HiLo”  analysis  for women  is driven  by different  factors.  As  was  discussed  above, 
relatively  few  prime-age  women  tend  to work  full-time,  full-year  consistently  over  ten  years. 
Even  in the  1980s.  only  33 percent  of prime-age  women  (versus  86 percent  of  men)  averaged 
over  1,750 hours  working  per  year.  Therefore,  few  women  are likely  to meet  the  test  of  long 
hours  in one  year,  although  most  women  are likely  to have  at least  one  year  with  under  1,750 
hours  worked.  This  perspective  is borne  out  in the  data:  in the  197Os, only  12 percent  of women 
met the  HiLo  criteria  with  this  figure  jumping  to 21 percent  in the  1980s.  The  differences  among 
women  by race  and  education  were  not  large.  But  since  women  with  higher  ten-year  earnings 
tended  to work  much  longer  hours  than  women  with  lower  earnings,  they  obviously  were  much 
more  I ikely  to experience  both  some  years  of long  hours  and  other  years  of short  hours. 
Another  way  to measure  the  change  in variation  in hours  over  a ten-year  period  in 
workers’  lives  is to look  at movements  in the coefficient  of variation  (CV,)  for both  men  and 
women.  As expected,  the  estimates  for  men  are generally  consistent  with  the  “HiLo”  estimates 
(see  Table  IO). 
For  prime  age  men  as a group,  there  is a small  (9.1%)  increase  in hours  dispersion 
between  the  two  decades,  a slightly  higher  figure  than  the 4.6%  increase  in the  “HiLo”  estimate. 
‘* -6l- 
However,  for  specific  subgroups,  the  CV, estimates  and  the  “HiLo”  estimates  do  not  yield  the 
same  rank  orderings.  For  example,  we  found  much  larger  inter-decade  growth  in the  “HiLo” 
index  for  white  men  than  for  black  men;  the  ordering  is reversed  for  the  CV,,  Similarly,  we  find 
that  the  largest  growth  in CV,  hours  dispersion  is found  among  the  lowest  earnings  quintile  so 
that  this  group  not  only  had  the  highest  level  of  inter-year  variance,  but  the  largest  inter-decade 
growth  in dispersion.” 
Among  women,  the  inter-year  variance  in hours  worked  is anywhere  from  three  to  five 
times  as great  as for  men.  This  is a statistically  quirk  of this  measure.  Since  women  tend  to  move 
in and  out  of  the  labor  force,  this  results  in large  variances  around  the  mean.  Thus  among  women 
with  continued  labor  force attachment  (those in the  highest  earnings  quintile),  the  CV,  is not  that 
different  than  men.  Further,  unlike  men,  the  variance  declines  sharply  between  the  1970s  and  the 
1980s.  Again,  this  reflects  the  movement  of women into the permanent  full-time  workforce  - 
with fewer women  spending  years  away  from  paid  work.  Given  that  women  still  have  primary 
responsibility  for  children  and  household  chores,  this  represents  women’s  increased  “second 
shift”  and  is evident  in Schors’,  ours,  and  other  people’s  data  on  overall  women’s  work. 
”  This  particular  result  suggests  just  why  the  two  measures  of dispersion  can  yield 
different  outcomes.  It is possible  that  the  lowest  earnings  quintile  could  have  a low  “HiLo” 
estimate  because  few  of  its members  ever  worked  more  than  2,400  hours.  However,  if variance 
below  2,400  hours  were  to increase,  the  coefficient  of variation  could  be substantial  and  trend 
upward. -62- 
Table  10 
CV,  Analysis  of Hours  Variance  for 
Individual  Workers  - by Sex 
Men  Women 
cv,  4rr  cv,  % 






HS  Dropout 
IIS  Graduate 
Some  College 
College  Grad  + 
Earnings  Quintiles 
Lowest  Q 
Fourth  Q 
Middle  Q 
Second  Q 
Top  Q 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on data  from  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics. -63- 
Conclusions 
In this  paper,  we  have  carefully  traced  the  changes  in men’s,  women’s,  and  family 
working  time.  When  considered  together,  we believe  the evidence  suggests  a new  regime  in 
labor  supply.  The  new  regime  is not  well  measured  by the  official  unemployment  rate. 
This  analysis  of  work  time  provides  strong  evidence  of both  “overwork”  and  “underemployment” 
not  only  across  the  work  force,  but  for  individual  groups  of workers  (particularly  men)  who  face 
bouts  of  full-time,  full-year  work  with  overtime  interspersed  with  years  of  less  than  full-time,  full 
year  work  (either  working  part-time  hours  or not  working  all the  weeks  of the  year).  In both  the 
1970s  and  the  198Os, more  than  one-quarter  of men  experienced  at least  one  year  as 
“overworked”  (averaging  over  46  hours  per  week)  and  at least  one  year  as “underemployed” 
(averaging  less  than  35 hours  per  week). 
It should  also  be noted  that  Americans  have  many  fewer  vacation  days  than  their  Western 
European  counterparts.  American  manufacturing  workers  average  4.6  weeks  of  vacations  and 
holidays  per  year  versus  a comparable  European  average  of 7.5  weeks  of  time  off.  German 
workers  have  the  most  generous  benefits,  with  8.5  weeks  of  vacation  and  holidays,  and  work  2.4 
hours  less  per  week.  As  a result,  American  manufacturing  workers  put  in 260  more  hours  per 
year  than  their  German  counterparts. 
How  much  of  this  long  and  persistent  working  time  is voluntary  cannot  be known  with 
certainty,  but  the  evidence  would  seem  to  indicate  that  Americans  expect  to work  long  hours 
through  their  prime  working  ages.  For  men,  this  means  full-time,  full-year  work  year  in and  year 
out.  Women,  on  the  other  hand,  remain  the  prime  care  givers  in the  home  and  have  to juggle -64- 
these  family  responsibilities  with  their  time  in the  paid  labor  force.  Due  to stagnant  or declining 
male  wages,  the  increased  working  time  of wives  has been  pivotal  in maintaining  family  living 
standards. 
Therefore.  whenever  workers  lose  their jobs  or are temporarily  laid  off,  they  feel 
compelled  to try to make  up  for  lost  income.  This  is what  has  made  the  apparent  change  in 
company  employment  policy  towards  a smaller  core  long-term  staff  such  an explosive  issue.  Not 
only  do  workers  lose  income  while  they  are unemployed,  many  have  great  difficulty  finding 
subsequent  jobs  at the  same  pay  rate  and  same  benefits  (Farber,  1996).  One  of the  coping 
mechanisms  is to work  long  hours  in one  or more  jobs  to fill  this  income  gap.  This  process  was 
confirmed  in  our  finding  that  those  workers  who  change  jobs  more  than  four  times  in a decade 
are more  than  three  times  as likely  to face  bouts  of “overwork”  and  “underemployment”  as those 
who  have  at most  one job  change  in a decade. 
Furthermore,  we  found  that  the  feast  or famine  cycle  was  prevalent  among  all classes  of 
prime-age  male  workers.  While  inter-year  work  time  instability  was  particularly  acute  among 
black  men,  among  high  school  dropouts,  and  among  men  in the  lowest  quintile  of earnings,  more 
than  one-quarter  of college  graduates  experienced  both  “overwork”  and  “underemployment”  as 
defined  here.  For  prime-age  women,  their  labor  hours  variability  remains  much  higher  than  that 
of  men  because  they  move  in and  out  of the  labor  force.  However,  there  has  been  a substantial 
drop  in inter-year  hours  dispersion  as more  women  enter  the  permanent  full-time  workforce. 
Returning  to our  theme  in the  introduction,  we can  now  better  understand  why  the 
connection  between  low  unemployment  and  rising  inflation  no  longer  seems  to hold  at 
unemployment  rates  significantly  below  the purported  6 percent  NAIRU  limit.  Job  instability -65 
and  stagnant  wages  have  made  workers  try to hold  onto  good  jobs.  Too  many  have  experienced 
the  costs  of  losing  a job  (or seen  family  members  or friends  faced  with  this  prospect)  for  their 
confidence  level  to be high  enough  to  forego  overtime  work  or moonlighting  if the  opportunity 
arises.  Furthermore,  their  bankbooks  are hardly  flush  enough  to support  them  during  their  job 
search. 
Consequently,  there  is more  labor  market  slack  than  many  realize.  Many  researchers 
have  noted  the  failure  of the  official  unemployment  rate  to include  involuntarily  part-time 
workers  and  those  discouraged  from  actively  seeking  employment.  As  we  have  shown,  the  rise 
in labor  force  participation  and  the  decline  in unemployment  has  accounted  for  a smaller  share  of 
the  increased  hours  worked  during  the  current  expansion.  Even  more  important,  as we  have 
shown,  the  length  of the  typical  work  week  has been  growing  so that  more  than  orze-siuttr of  the 
additional  hours  offered  the  labor  market  is now  coming  from  this  important,  but  normally 
unmeasured,  source.  Finally,  we have  uncovered  greater  volatility  and  insecurity  in indidvidual 
worker  careers. 
Whether  all of these  factors  can  be combined  and  quantified  into  a single  measure  of 
labor  market  tightness  requires  more  research  and  historical  experience.  But  surely,  such  a 
development  would  be  immensely  useful  as a substitute  for  the  currently  measured 
unemployment  rate. 
Will  the  current  climate  of job  insecurity,  frequent  job  loss,  and  stagnating  wages  soon 
change‘?  Are  we on  the  verge,  given  low  unemployment  rates,  of  returning  to the  old  labor 
market  regime  of  declining  average  work  weeks  and  annual  work  hours?  We  do  not  think  so. 
The  underlying  phenomena  of global  competition,  technological  change,  weakened  unions,  and -66- 
industry  deregulation  give  no  sign  of dissipating.  As such,  at current  sustainable  economic 
growth  rates,  over  the  foreseeable  future  one  can expect  a continued  upward  trend  in hours  which 
will  provide  the  needed  labor  supply  to keep  inflation  under  control.  These  institutional 
phenomena  will  therefore  accomplish  much  of what  the  Fed  might  have  done  in the  past  to  keep 
price  increases  in check.  Indeed,  the  Fed  might  even  be able  to  relax  short-term  interes;  rates  a 
bit  in a bid  to  increase  growth  rates  without  endangering  price  stability. 
There  are,  to be sure,  often  enormous  personal,  family,  and  community  costs  incurred  as a 
result  of  the  trend  toward  “overwork”  in America.  But,  as we  have  seen  here,  there  is one 
substantial  benefit  -  price  stability  at low  unemployment  rates.  If we can  now  reward 
hardworking  Americans  with  faster  growth  and  the  prospect  of rising  wage  rates,  the  longer  work 
weeks  will  not  have  been  totally  in vain. -67- 
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